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Preservation of Scenic Rivers
By A. DAN TARLOCK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The ultimate argument against preserving some of the nation's
unique scenic resources was advanced by a lawyer who divined
that God did not intend that any land be left in wilderness. This
attitude, while slightly overstated, expresses the basic assumption
underlying current water law: water is a scarce resource whose
exploitation should be encouraged but regulated to achieve opti-
mum time distribution. There has been little recognition that
in some instances preservation of a river in its free-flowing con-
dition should be its highest use, but public demand that "some
of the unspoiled stretches of our waterways ... be preserved...
for the public use and enjoyment of scenic, fish, wildlife, and
outdoor recreation values' 2 is increasing.
In 1964 Congress passed the first scenic rivers legislation, the
Ozark National Scenic Riverways Act.3 Legislation to establish
a national scenic river system has been before Congress since
1964 and has been a part of the President's legislative program
ever since and several states have or are beginning to undertake
programs designed to preserve selected streams.4 The necessity
* A.B., LL.B., Stanford University; Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Stephen
Spiller, second-year student at the University of Kentucky College of Law, in the
preparation of Part 11.
1 1958 Proceedings, National Reclamation Association 136 (1958).
2 Hearings on S. 1446 and S. 897 Before a Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1964) (Letter from Stewart Udall, Secretary of
Interior, to Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey, President of the Senate, which appears
in the Hearing report.) [Hereinafter cited as Hearings].
378 Stat. 608 (1964), 16 U.S.C. § 460(m) (Supp. 1966). The Act provides
a joint program betveen the federal government and the state of Missouri for the
creation and administration of the Current River and Jacks Forks River watershed
"for the purpose of conserving and interpreting the unique scenic and other
natural values and objects of historic interest including preservation of the Current
River and the Jacks Forks River in Missouri as free-flowing streams ... "
4 See e.g., S. 1446, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964) and H.R. 14922, 88th Cong.
2nd Sess. (1965). There has been prior congressional recognition of the aesthetic
value of water. In the Superior National Forest in Minnesota, Congress pro-
vided that "no further alteration of the natural water level of any lake or stream
(Continued on next page)
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for undertaking scenic river programs is apparent. Conservation-
ists have recently won a bitter battle to prevent portions of the
Grand Canyon from being flooded by the waters of two federally
constructed dams, yet the Canyon's ultimate fate remains in
doubt.5 If future power needs are to be met from the the con-
tinued use of hydroelectric power, it is estimated that the "dam-
ming of every usable canyon in the far west will be required.6
State and federal agencies, particularly the Bureau of Reclama-
tion and the Army Corps of Engineers, are development minded;
"they do not see themselves as jealous guardians of unique na-
tional treasures, but as friendly accomplices to progress. ' 7 Cur-
rent laws governing water resources allocation generally fail to
provide for the preservation of free-flowing water. Preservation
must be accomplished via the political process by defeating legis-
lative or administrative authorization of projects threatening a
free-flowing stream.
A major impetus to current interest in the preservation of
free-flowing water is the rapid growth of recreation, brought
about by an increase in wages and leisure time, as a major indus-
try in many states. Comprehensive federal planning for recreation
was initiated in 1958 by the creation of the National Outdoor
Recreation Resources Review Commission to "compile a nation-
wide inventory and evaluation of outdoor recreation resources ...
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
within or bordering upon the designated area" shall be authorized without Congres-
sional authorization. 46 Stat. 1021 (1930), 16 U.S.C. § 577(b) (1958). The
management of the area is discussed in Lucas, Wilderness Perception and Use:
The Example of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area, 8 NAT. Rzs. J. 394 (1964).5 Controversy over the construction of dams in the Grand Canyon began
when legislation was introduced in Congress to authorize the construction of
the Central Arizona Project, which would allow Arizona to transport the share
of water allotted her in Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 840 (1964) and Arizona
v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). Construction of two hydroelectric dams at
either entrance to the canyon to finance the project was proposed. Opposition
to the proposed dams was led by the Sierra Club, a national conservation organ-
ization. The story is long and fascinating. See e.g., Nash, Dams in Grand Canyon-
A Necessary Evil?, SnaiA CLun BuLL. 37 (Dec. 1965). For an excellent legal
history of the fight over use of the water from the Colorado River see Meyers,
The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. Rzv. 1 (1966). Arizona has announced its
intention to construct the project if federal assistance is not obtained, and it has
applied to the Federal Power Commission for a license to construct the two
dams. Legislation has been introduced in the 90th Congress to preserve Con-
gressional jurisdiction over construction of hydroelectric projects on the Colorado
River by providing for a three-year moratorium on Federal Power Commission
proceedings. H.R. 2128, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).6 Stone, High Dams and Upstream Storage (Paper presented at Second An-
nual Water Resources Conference held at Univ. of Mont. in 1957).
7 Reinhardt, Shadows on the Feather, CRY CALinOwnA 24 (Fall 1966).
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and recommend what policies should be adopted and what pro-
grams initiated, at each level of government." Many states are
preparing comprehensive recreation plans. 9
With the exception of pleasure driving, water based recreation
is the most popular form of outdoor leisure. Most recreational
uses of water are generally consistent with, and increasingly made
a part of, projects designed to harness a river.'0 Power-boaters and
water-skiers welcome reservoirs. It is the white-water canoeist,
the sport fisherman, and the naturalist who require a free-flowing
stream to enjoy their recreational preferences. These recreational
users of free-flowing water are a minority," but in some instances
it has been suggested that the highest use of a river will be to
preserve it in its free-flowing condition due to the revenue gen-
erated in the area by this kind of recreational spending.' 2 The
Secretary of Interior has recommended that wild rivers be pre-
served for their scenic, fish, wildlife, and outdoor recreation
816 U.S.C. § 17(b) (1964).9 See e.g., Wisconsin, The Outdoor Recreation Plan, WIsCONsIN DEVELOP-
Nr SEams (1966).
1079 Stat. 213 (1965), 16 U.S.C. § 4601 (12) (Supp. 1966) provides:
"It is the policy of Congress . . . that (a) in investigating and planning any Fed-
eral navigation, flood control, reclamation, hydroelectric, or multi-purpose water
resource project, full consideration shall be given to the opportunities, if any, for
outdoor recreation and for fish and wildlife enhancement...." Conflicts be-
tween recreation and other uses of water in a multi-pur ose project do occur over
problems such as maintenance of minimum summer fae levels. For example, a
flood control or irrigation dam and reservoir may include recreation facilities,
such as boat docks, but it becomes necessary to draw down the reservoir during
the summer to provide storage capacity during the flood season or to provide
for irrigation needs. The shore may be tumed into a mud flat, thus curtailing
recreational use. See Sax, Federalism in Reclamation Law, 37 CoLo. L. BEv. 49,
75-77 (1964) and Hopkins, Impacts of Recreation on Competition for Use of
Water, Western Resources Papers-Water, Development, Utilization, Conserva-
tion 151, 155 (1963).
11 A free-flowing river can generally be classified as a resource-based outdoor
recreation area. The dominant characteristic of this area is its
outstanding scenic or other recreational quality .. .these areas lie at a
considerable distance from the large centers of population, this requires
relatively long travel to reach them .... Costs of visiting such areas are
also unavoidably high for most people, and this tends to limit their use
to people with average or higher incomes.
Clawson & Knetsch, Outdoor Recreational Research: Some Suggested Concepts
and Suggested Areas of Study, 3 NAT. TRis. J. 250, 259 (1963). The main recre-
ational use of the area will be for "high-quality-recreation, frequently with in-
spirational overtones" such as canoeing, hiking, fishing, rapid running, and back-
packing. Lucas, supra note 4. The article contains a good discussion of the
attitude of the recreationist toward his environment. The Wisconsin recreation
plan's standards for canoeing rivers are at least one-half mile per stream per
canoe and a minimum flow rate of 100 cubic feet per second during the summer.
See Wisconsin, The Outdoor Recreation Plan, supra note 9, at 11 and 91.12 This was asserted to be the case by the federal government for the Green
River in Wyoming. For a criticism of this assertion, see Hearings at 404-09.
1967]
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values. An unharnessed river, in the words of Mr. Justice Doug-
las, is a "refuge for automated man"' 3 and "a memorial to the
untouched, unspoiled continent as it looked before the tides of
civilization reached it."' 4
The endless arguments between exploiters and conservation-
ists need no recapitulation. Granted the premise that some rivers
should be preserved, the inquiry thus becomes a determination
of the means necessary to incorporate these values into the natural
resource decision-making process. In answer to this inquiry, Mr.
Justice Douglas's answer is simple: "Wilderness values are greater
than any price that can be placed upon the hydro-electric power
of its rivers."' 5 He attempts to equate protection of these values
with the constitutional guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights,
thus concluding that advocates of wilderness areas such as a wild
river are entitled to the guarantee that "large areas of the original
America be preserved in perpetuity."' 16 However, the analogy
between wilderness values and minority rights does not seem
valid. Mr. Justice Douglas draws the analogy to argue that the
values gained from wilderness preservation are superior to those
which would be gained from any other use of the area. The fal-
lacy in this assertion is that all groups-commercial exploiters,
general outdoor recreationists, and the conservationists-have val-
id claims against our natural resources. The problem is choosing
which one or ones to recognize in a given instance. For example,
it is difficult to distinguish, as a general proposition, between the
demands of the water-skier for an accessible lake and those of the
canoeist for the solitude of a wild river. Neither claim should be
excluded from consideration by those who must decide on the
optimum use of an area. The problem is obviously complex, for
not every river can be preserved in its natural state due to the
many legitimate claims against our natural resources. But it is
equally clear that not every spectacular river gorge need be a dam
site. Comprehensive water recreation planning which accommo-
dates a variety of preferences is needed.
13 DOUGLAS, A WIumursS BmL OF PIGHTS 31 (1965). This value is often
asserted, but has not yet been empirically demonstrated. Social scientists are di-
vided as to the correlation between a crowded environment and mental health
problems. See DEPARTmENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEvoPENT, OPEN
SPACE FOR URBAN AMmUCA 3 (1965).
14 Id. at 29.
15 Ibid.
16 Id. at 26.
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This article attempts to critically evaluate water law concepts
relating to the preservation of free-flowing rivers and to suggest
modifications in existing doctrines necessary to effectuate the in-
corporation of preservation values into water use decisions. The
article will discuss: (1) existing doctrines governing the recogni-
tion of rights to the free-flow; (2) state preservation legislation
and the extent to which preservation values are incorporated into
administrative regulation of water use; (3) the extent to which
preservation values are incorporated into federal dam construc-
tion decisions; and (4) proposed national scenic river programs.
II. STATE
A. Riparian Rights
The doctrine of riparian rights provides that all persons own-
ing land contiguous to a water course have equal rights to use of
the water.17 Although the doctrine has not recognized a property
right to the free-flow of a stream for aesthetic purposes, courts
have guaranteed the amout of water necessary to prevent destruc-
tion of recreational uses by competing ones.'8 To understand the
problems involved in recognizing a riparian right to free-flow for
aesthetic purposes, it is necessary to discuss briefly the develop-
ment of the two theories of riparian use.
The first theory, the natural flow theory, was developed at
a time when the major uses of water were domestic consumption
and generation of power to run mills. The early cases involved
conflicts between mill owners and riparians who diverted water
upstream rendering mill operation impossible.' 9 These early cases
announced the theory that each riparian had the right to have
the water reach his property undiminished in quantity and qual-
ity. 20 This doctrine never existed in its pure form because courts
were quick to see that its logical consequence was to prohibit
diversion by all but the last riparian on the stream. He could
enjoin upstream users without showing any injury, thereby sti-
17 TRELEASE, BLOONMNTHAL & GERAUD, CASES ON NATuRAL RESoURCES 1
(1965).18 See cases cited notes 27-32, infra.
19 1 WEzt, WATEn RIGHTs iN WSrmTE STATES § 666 (3d ed. 1911).
LAr E, THE iPRIAN BIGHEr As PROPERTY, WAT REsoURcES AND =ns LAW
196 (1958).2 0 See e.g., Hendick v. Cook, 4 Ga. 241, 256 (1848).
19671
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fling economic development.21 Consequently, courts and legisla-
tures have almost universally abandoned the natural flow the-
ory.2 2 Because of the adverse economic consequences of this
theory, it should not serve as a theoretical basis for preserving
the free-flow of streams for aesthetic purposes although it could
theoretically be revived.
The reasonable use theory has replaced the natural flow the-
ory. It recognizes that each riparian has a correlative right to
the reasonable use of the water free from unreasonable interfer-
ence. The terms, reasonable and unreasonable, are not suscep-
tible of precise definition except in the context of a case-by-case
choice among the conflicting claims of users. Before making such
a determination, courts must consider a wide range of factors.23
A use which may be reasonable in one case may be unreasonable
in another. The courts have held that use of water for recreation
is a reasonable use,24 but the cases are silent as to the reasonable-
ness in preserving the free-flow solely for aesthetic purposes.2
Nor has preservation of the free-flow been held an unreasonable
use per se. There are only a few uses such as pollution which
have been held to be unreasonable per se.26 The law also distin-
guishes between domestic and artificial uses, giving preference to
the former.2 7 Generally, as a practical matter, domestic uses are
relatively unimportant since they are usually limited to the
21 English cases have consistently recognized the right to divert water and to
apply it to riparian lands. See 1 Weil, op. cit. supra note 19, at 735-44.
22See e.g., Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420 (1874). See also T ,ELEAsE,
BLOomMNTHAL & GERAUD, op. cit. supra note 17, at 2.23 In McCord v. Big Brothers Movement, Inc., 120 N.J. Eq. 446, 185 AtI.
480 (1936), the court enjoined a summer camp from diverting water to fill a
swimming pond to the detriment of a downstream mill owner because: "The
transfer to a large number of invitees of the bathing use of transported waters
exceeds the reasonable use to which the riparian owner is entitled." Id. at 449, 185
Ati. at 482. See Note, Riparian Water Law-Lakeshore Developments, 1966
Wis. L. REv. 172, 178-82 (1966). See also Half Moon Bay Land Co. v. Cowell,
173 Cal. 543, 160 Pac. 675 (1916).2 4 Bino v. City of Hurley, 273 Wis. 10, 76 N.W.2d 571 (1956) (prohibition
of use of lake for swimming and other recreational uses to protect the quality of a
domestic water supply is a taking of riparian rights). See In re Clinton Water
Dist. of Island County, 126 Wash. 284, 218 P.2d 309 (1950); but see, State v.
Heller, 123 Conn. 492, 196 Ad. 337 (1937), appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 627
(1937).
25 Dean Trelease asserts that the use of water for aesthetic enjoyment is a reason-
able use, but the cases cited involved conventional recreation activities. See Tre-
lease, The Concept of Beneficial Use in Surface Streams, 12 Wyo. L. J. 1, 6
(1957).2 6 Lauer, op. cit. supra note 19, at 202.
27 Id. at 201. For a critique of the distinction between domestic and artificial
uses, see Meng v. Coffey, 67 Neb. 500, 93 N.W. 713 (1903).
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amount of water necessary to sustain a household and related
activities. 28
The cases recognizing riparian rights for recreational use have
held that a riparian has a right to a specified quantity of water
for recreational use. However, these cases principally involved
the maintenance of minimum lake levels. In Harris v. Brooks,29
plaintiff, who was a lessor of a fishing resort on a small lake, ob-
jected to defendant's plan to draw it down to irrigate a rice field
because the lake would become unsuitable "for fishing, recrea-
tion, or other lawful purposes. '30 The court held that recreational
use was reasonable and equal to all other artificial uses and that
the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction or equitable adjustment
if the defendants' interference was unreasonable. The court de-
cided, without giving any reasons, that defendant's use was un-
reasonable and that plaintiff was entitled to a minimum lake
level. In short, the case holds that irrigation which interferes
with recreational use of a lake is an unreasonable use and in
effect prefers recreation over irrigation. This holding is incon-
sistent with the theory that in times of scarcity each riparian must
bear a proportionate share of the losses resulting from curtailment
of use.
The problem in Harris is that the two riparian uses cannot
co-exist. Seldom can they bear equally the burden of curtailment
in times of scarcity. Where the court is confronted with this
problem, it is better to prefer one use than lose the utility of both.
The case which dramatically illustrates this dilemma is Sandusky
Portland Cement Co. v. Dixon Pure Ice Co.31 In that case, one
riparian required water for cooling heavy machinery, while the
other maintained an ice cutting operation down stream. Dis-
charge of warm water by the cooling machine made it impossible
for the ice company to obtain ice. The court enjoined the factory
owner from interfering with plaintiff's ice cutting operation. The
opinion implies that the obtaining of injunctions may depend
upon who wins the race to the courthouse.
28 Institutions and resorts have qualified for a preference as a domestic use.
See Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. App. 2d 549, 150 P.2d 405 (1944). For other
instances where large numbers of persons have been entitled to preference, see
TaREnAsE, supra note 25, at 4.
29225 Ark. 435, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955).
3o Id. at 130.
31221 Fed. 200 (7th Cir. 1915), discussed in 1 SATO, WATm REsOuRCEs
ALLOCATION ch. III, § 8 (1962).
1967]
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Another lake level case, Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co.,3 2 suggests
that the resort owner's right might be confined to the normal
lake level. The coal company's use of the lake and shore for the
recreation of its officers and employees conflicted with a com-
mercial citrus grower's use of the lake. The court quoted Farn-
ham, Waters and Water Rights which states that "the owner of
land on the margin of a natural lake or pond has a right to have
the natural level of the water maintained, so as to permit him to
enjoy the advantages attended upon riparian ownership, and to
protect him from the disadvantages of having a strip of uncovered
lake bottom left in front of his property."33 The court held that
if normal level was drawn down, damaging recreational uses,
the company was entitled to an injunction. Other cases have sug-
gested that littoral owners are entitled to somewhat broader rights
than merely maintenance of minimum levels. An early Indiana
case held that the owners of lake front cottages had a right to main-
tenance of the lake levels existing at the time of their purchase.34
Using theories of prescription or estoppel, courts have saved the
vacationer from looking out on a bed of cracked mud.35 These
cases are apparently applying the discredited natural flow doc-
trine to lakes, and the courts have held that the lake cases are not
applicable to flowing water.
In Dunlap v. North Carolina Power & Light Co.,30 plaintiff,
a riparian who used a stream for fishing, alleged that defendant's
construction of a dam and hydroelectric generating facility up-
stream "deprives him of the pleasure and profit in pursuit of
fishing and other ordinary uses of said water and results in ma-
terial injury to the banks of the stream." The injury was caused
by the substitution of the normal flow pattern with a fluctuating
pattern created by defendant's generator. The court held that the
doctrine of reasonable use applied and that defendant's use was
not unreasonable. The court reasoned that if plaintiff is guar-
anteed a right to the natural flow, it "would mean that a stream
32 43 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1949).
83 2 FABNHAm, WATE AND WATER PIGHTS 1618 (1904).
3 4 Valparaiso City Water Co. v. Dickover, 17 Ind. App. 233, 46 N.E. 591
(1897) (city entitled to water but had to pay damages for mud flats resulting
from lower lake levels). See also Note, Riparian Water Law-Lakeshore Develop-
ments, supra note 23, at 173.3 5 Smith v. Youmans, 96 Wis. 103, 70 N.W. 1115 (1897).
36212 N.C. 814, 195 S.E. 43 (1938).
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not theretofore used for water power purposes could never be so
used, because the person who first undertook to avail himself of
the water power capabilities of the stream would find that he
was not making reasonable use thereof as to other owners." 37
Courts will probably follow Dunlap, since recognition of such
a sweeping right to a constant flow would frustrate upstream
development. However, the case should not be interpreted as
prohibiting recognition of rights to the free-flow for recreational
purposes. A better approach would be for courts to recognize
that the use of the stream for recreational purposes is reasonable
and that the recreational user is entitled to a proportionate share
of the stream in times of shortage but is not entitled to a
preference over other users.
The above cases offer little help in formulating a consistent
approach to the recognition of riparian rights to the free-flow of
the stream. However, recognition may be obtained in two ways.
First, the state legislature could, as a matter of public policy,
decide that recreational uses are preferred over all others except
domestic ones. Secondly, it has also been suggested that conflicts
be resolved by a case-by-case determination of which party is
making the highest use of the water. This could be determined
by calculating the marginal values of the goods and service pro-
duced by each water use.38 This would necessitate the develop-
ment of economic models similar to those suggested by Professor
James in his article, appearing in this symposium. However,
this approach would probably insure only the protection of the
commercial resort owner. The public's interest would not be
recognized because in most instances free-flowing water for
aesthetic and recreational purposes has little or no measurable
market value. If it does have some value, it is less than other
uses such as irrigation and power.39
In conclusion, analysis of the cases in this area demonstrates
37 Id. at 47.
38See Yeutter, A Legal-Economic Critique of the Nebraska Water Course
Law, 44 NEB. L. REV. 11, 49-50 (1965).
3 9 It has been asserted that the intangible values represented by a free-flowing
river can be quantified by calculating the unit value of social gain to be recognized
from a unit of expenditure on recreation. See Davis, Recreation Planning As An
Economic Problem, 3 NAT. REs. J. 239 (1963). However, at present "Not much
is known about the response to prices for recreational access to water quantity
and quality.' Tolley, Future Economics Research on Western Water Resources-
With Particular Reference to California, 5 NAT. Rns. 1. 259, 265 (1965).
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that the private law of water rights doctrines is unsuited to
the protection of these values.40 The author believes that the
fears of the court in Dunlap are valid.41 One user's decision to
use the free-flow of the stream for aesthetic purposes or limited
recreational uses could necessitate the curtailment of a sub-
stantial number of legitimate uses. Ultimately, society may de-
cide to do so in order to gain the benefits derived from preserving
the stream, but this is a decision which should be made by state
legislatures or by properly authorized administrative agencies
rather than private individuals.
B. Prior Appropriation
The doctrine of prior appropriation, which is law in states
west of the ninety-eighth meridian, recognizes rights to water
applied to a beneficial use regardless of the laws of its use. It
further guarantees the foremost right of the first person to
divert the water since, in times of scarcity, the first person who
initiates use will be the last one to be curtailed.42
The fundamental premise of western water law is that water
is a scarce resource that must be exploited in the most efficient
manner; thus, the idea of preserving the free-flow of the stream
for recreational and aesthetic purposes is contrary to western
thinking about natural resources. 43 The free-flow of the stream
can not be appropriated under existing doctrine. The reason
given is that the requirements for a perfected appropriation
have not been met. These requirements are twofold: (1) the
water must actually be diverted and (2) it must be applied to
4o Cf. Harnsberger, Prescriptive Water Rights in Wisconsin, 1961 Wis. L.
REv. 37, 59 (1961).41 Yeutter, supra note 38, at 52-53. (The author has speculated that
Should the people of Nebraska fear this potential adjustment in the state's
economy? Three factors negate any feeling of undue concern.... (3)
Nebraska cannot legitimately be classified as a potential dust bowl-
industrial, power, and recreational uses which have higher marginal
productivities than agriculture are relatively insignificant at the moment.
Furthermore, such uses are virtually non-consumptive; therefore, even
large demands for them will have little impact on the water supply
available for irrigation.)
This may be true from a state-wide perspective, but cases such as Dunlap indi-
cate that up-stream users in the immediate area must be curtailed if rights to
the free-flow are to be recognized.
42 TBRELEASE, BLOOMNraTAL & GERAuD, supra note 17, at 2.
4 See Trelease, Land, Water and People, 18 Wyo. L.J. 8, 9 (1963).
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a beneficial use.44 The few decided recent cases have denied the
appropriation because of the lack of an actual appropriation.
Hence, they do not reach the question of beneficial use.45 An
examination of the reasons behind the actual diversion require-
ment clearly demonstrates the absence of a conceptual barrier
to recognition of rights to the free-flow.
In the early development of the West there was considerable,
and highly justified, fear that control of water resources would
fall into the hands of speculators to the detriment of the small
farmer and entrepreneur. It was feared that the speculator could
control the water by filing large claims for appropriations with
no plans to apply the water, thus forcing those who actually
wanted to use it to pay his price since on paper the stream was
fully appropriated. 46 In order to discourage this type of specula-
tion, a requirement was built into the law that a claim to
appropriate must be accompanied by an act manifesting the
intent to use the water in a socially acceptable manner before
a perfected right would be recognized. Early cases indicate that
the courts did not think in terms of the actual diversion re-
quirement as they do to-day, but rather in terms of incorporating
an anti-speculative policy into the law.
In McDonald & Blackburn v. Bear River & Auburn Water
& Mining Co., 47 there was a fight between operators of a grist
and saw mill and an upstream mining company which subse-
quently diverted the water. They guaranteed the mill owner
the volume of water he was accustomed to using prior to the
diversion, reasoning, "The right accrues from appropriation;
this appropriation is the intent to take accompanied by some
open physical demonstration of intent, and for some valuable
44 For a discussion of the application of the doctrine of prior appropriation
to recreational use of water see Comment, Water Appropriation for Recreation, 1
LAND AND WATER L. REv. (1966).
45 After reviewing the cases involving recreation as a beneficial use, Dean
Trelease concludes: "The use of water for beautifying parks and resorts where
people may rest and enjoy themselves and for forming pools and lakes for swim-
ming, boating, fishing, and hunting is an undoubtedly beneficial use, but the
limits of appropriations for these purposes have not been fully explored or
stated by the courts." Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in
the Source of Surface Streams, 12 Wyo. L.J. 1, 11 (1957). California State
Water Bights Board Dec. 1030 held that use of the free-flow for recreation
was a reasonable beneficial use, but denied the appropriation because there was
no diversion.
46See Toohey v. Campbell, 24 Mont. 13, 60 Pac. 396 (1900).
47 13 Cal. 220 (1859).
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use." 48 The open physical demonstration of intent was the in-
stallation of a water wheel and operation of the mill, not an
actual diversion. Another example of the flexibility of the early
decisions were those cases allowing a person to perfect an ap-
propriation without an actual diversion merely by taking
advantage of the seasonal over-flow of the stream for irrigation
of bottom land.49
The first case in which a court had to decide if the free-flow
could be appropriated for aesthetic and recreational purposes
was Cascade Town Co. v. Empire Water & Power Co.50 In that
case, the plaintiff owned a large resort complex at the mouth of
a canyon and falls which were alleged to be "rare in beauty
and constitute the chief scenic attraction" '51 of the hotel. De-
fendant power company purchased a reservoir site above the
falls and announced its intention to divert the creek. The federal
district court enjoined defendant, finding that the two require-
ments for a perfected appropriation were satisfied. The court
found that the use was beneficial because of the social benefits
which accrue from summer resorts52 and, analogizing from the
"over-flow" cases, held that use of the canyon for scenic walk-ways
constituted a valid appropriation. The Eighth Circuit court
reversed, 53 on the grounds that the district court based its decision
largely on the aesthetic value of the falls, making no inquiry
into the effectiveness of the plaintiff's utilization of the water
compared with customary methods of irrigation. It held "com-
plainant [was] not entitled to a continuance of the falls solely
for their scenic beauty" but only to the amount of water neces-
sary to support the vegetation in the canyon.54 The court's
opinion indicates the two requirements had been met, but the
appropriation was denied because doctrines which recognize
48 Id. at 232-33.49 See, e.g., Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530 (1880) (dictum). But see
Hill v. Standard Mining Co., 12 Idaho 233, 85 Pac. 907 (1906). WELL, VATm
E IGTs n =r WSTERN STATES § 367 (3rd ed. 1911).
50 181 Fed. 1011 (D.C. Colo. 1910).
r1 Id. at 1012. The falls and canyon had an exceptional variety of wild flowers,
native flora, and fauna according to plaintiff's expert witness.
52 They quoted with approval plaintiff's brief which rhetorically asked, "Is
it no benefit to the public to spend money in making a beautiful place in nature
visible and enjoyable? ...It is a benefit to the weary, that they can have the
wild beauties of nature placed at their convenient disposal." Id. at 1017.
53205 Fed. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
54 Id. at 129.
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rights to the free-flow result in a waste of a scarce resource to
the ultimate detriment of the community.
The fear of encouraging wasteful users of water, if rights
to the free-flow are recognized, is illustrated by the court's cita-
tion to Schodde v. Twin Falls Water & Power Co.55 There,
plaintiff, who obtained water from a deep gorge using current-
driven lifting devices, sued to enjoin defendant power company
from constructing a downstream dam which would reduce the
velocity of the flow. The denial of the injunction was affirmed
by the Supreme Court which reasoned:
If the plaintiff were permitted to own the current of the
stream as appurtenant to his right of appropriation and
diversion, he would be able to add indefinitely to the water
right he would control and own. There might be a great
surplus of water in the stream at and above plaintiffs
premises, and an urgent demand for a portion of this surplus
for beneficial uses, but if an appropriator should divert a
sufficient quantity to the current under plaintiffs' water
wheels so that they would not revolve, the plaintiff would
have a cause of action to prevent such an appropriation.
It is clear that in such cases the policy of the state to reserve
the waters of the flowing streams for the benefit of the people
would be defeatedr 6
Schodde is important because it clearly illustrates that the law
against appropriation of the free-flow of the stream is based on
broad notions of social policy.
It has been suggested that private individuals cannot ap-
propriate for recreational purposes if they fail to maintain
exclusive control and benefit over the water. In Lake Shore Duck
Club v. Lake View Duck Club,57 two rival private-hunting clubs
sought to appropriate a quantity of water to "produce natural
grasses, tules, rushes and other vegetation suitable for wild water
foul" on an uninhabited part of the public domain. The appropri-
ation was denied on the theory that "an appropriation must be one
which inures to the exclusive benefit of the appropriator and is
subject to his complete dominion and control."58
G 224 U.S. 107 (1911).
56 Id. at 120.
5750 Utah 76, 166 Pac. 309 (1917); See also Division Lake Club v. Health,
126 Tex. 129, 86 S.W.2d 441 (1935). These cases are discussed in Trelease,
supra note 45, at 13.
5s Id. at 311.
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There is no reason to place this restriction on the appropria-
tion of water for recreational use. The only essential condition
is that the water be put to a community-approved use. If this
qualification is met and if the community decides that water
for recreational use is available, it has no interest in seeing that
people who have control of the appropriation are the exclusive
beneficiaries.
More importantly, can private individuals appropriate the
free-flow of the stream to the exclusion of the public? The
answer may depend upon whether the water course is navigable,
or whether the bed is state or privately owned. 9 The public has
a right to make recreational use of all navigable lakes and streams
where the bed is state owned.60 Some courts have extended this
right to the enjoyment of scenic beauty.6' In that instance, the
courts should hold that a private individual or organization
cannot appropriate the free-flow to the exclusion of the public.
Where the bed is privately owned, the jurisdictions are split
on whether a right of public use exists6 2 and presumably those
which deny a public use might permit an appropriation of the
free-flow to the exclusion of the public,6 3 if, of course, it is not
denied for other reasons.
Recent decisions have not re-evaluated the policy underlying
denial of recognition of rights to the free-flow but hold there
can be no appropriation because there has been no diversion.64
59 See Waite, Public Rights in Navigable Waters, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 335(1958) and Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western
Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RPs. J. 1 (1967) for a comprehensive discussion of
the public's right to the use of the surface of water courses for recreational
purposes.60 Johnson & Austin, supra note 59, at 7, 34. The only "public ownership"
state which does not recognize a public right to use water for recreation is
Colorado. Hartman v. Tresese, 37 Colo. 146, 84 Pac. 385 (1905).61 Muench v. Public Service Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514 (1952).
See also Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 145 N.W. 815 (1914).62Johnson & Austin, supra note 59, at 33-34.
63 Even if a state recognizes a right to appropriate the free-flow, this right
is subject to destruction without compensation by the federal government by a
subsequent exercise of the navigation servitude. U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); see Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters:
The Navigation Power, 2 NAT. REs. J. 37 (1963). But see Corker, Water Rights
and Federalism-the Western Water Rights Settlement of 1957, 45 CALIF. L.
R v. 604, 616 (1957).64 A town at the mouth of California's Russian River filed a permit with the
State Water Rights Board to appropriate 125 cubic feet per second of the summer
flow by releasing water from an upstream reservoir to maintain the river at a
sufficient level to support full recreational use during the tourist season. The Board
denied the permit because an appropriation requires a diversion. State Water
Rights Board Dec. 1030 (1961).
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In Colorado River Conservation District v. Rocky Mountain
Power Co.,65 the District became concerned over the decreasing
quality of fishing in the south fork of the White River in
Colorado, and brought an action for an adjudication of water
rights, claiming an appropriation for "the preservation of fish
life and the propagation of the fish." The District relied on its
enabling act for the proposition "that a minimum flow of water
may be 'appropriated' in a natural stream for piscatorial pur-
poses without diversion of the water 'appropriated' from the
natural course of the stream." In the alternative, it attempted
to meet the diversion requirement by arguing that it had mani-
fested its intention through the construction of campgrounds,
access roads, fish hatcheries, and utilization of the stream by
the general public.
The court held these acts did not constitute an actual diversion
because no water was taken from the stream and, citing Schodde,
reasoned that the statute did not permit the District to make an
appropriation without an actual diversion because "the legis-
lature did not intend to bring about such an extreme departure
from well established doctrine ."66 The court did not have to
decide if the use of a portion of the flow for recreation and the
propagation of fish was a beneficial use. There is some confusion
in the early Colorado cases, 67 but recent state administrative
practices indicate that release of water for the preservation of
fish is a beneficial use.," There is no logical basis for distinguish-
ing between protection of fishlife by requiring the release of
water from a reservoir upstream and protection through recog-
nizing a right to a minimum flow by prohibiting upstream
diversions which would impair the guaranteed flow. These are
merely alternative means of achieving the same purpose. When
05 406 P.2d 798 (Colo. 1965). See Ellis, Recreational Uses for Water Under
Prior Appropriation Law, 6 NAT. RES. J. 181 (1966); Comment, 27 MoNT. L.
REv. 211 (1966).60 406 P.2d at 800.6 7 In Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 98 Pac. 729
(1908), it was held that, under an 1881 act providing for the creation of water
storage districts, water could not be stored for the propagation of fish.
us The City of Denver agreed with the Colorado Game, Fish, and Parks
Department in 1966 to release fifty seconds per foot or the natural flow of the
Blue River, which ever is less, from one of its reservoirs in order to maintain
fishlife in the river. The Act in question also points out that the Legislature has
recognized the preservation of fish as a beneficial use. Colorado Water Congress,
Newsletter 9 (Oct. 1966).
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a state has decided that the preservation of fish is an appropriate
use of water, courts should not frustrate the implementation of
this policy with artificial conceptual barriers. 9
The courts have denied the right to appropriate the free-
flow because of the conviction that to do so would result in a
misallocation of resources. This conviction was based upon the
idea that the public interest would be best served by allowing
a large number of individuals to divert the stream. But this is
no longer the only set of values encompassed in state water
resources policies, for it is now recognized that water use de-
cisions must be based on a wider range of values, such as the
public's interest in enjoying the scenic beauty of a free-flow and
in making use of the recreational advantages it offers. However,
the recognition of these types of public rights in free-flow does
not mean that they should be secured through a series of private
decisions except in situations where the proposed uses have a
recognized market value and thus should be treated the same
as irrigation and power generation uses. The decision to with-
draw water for aesthetic and specialized recreational purposes
potentially has a far reaching impact on development of the
river basin. Therefore, the decision should be made by public
officials who can rationally assess the full impact of withdrawal
on community demands and its water supply.70
The court, in cases such as Colorado Water Conservation
District, should have determined if the legislature intended to
delegate to the District the authority to withdraw water from de-
velopment. The intent to delegate might be found by the creation
of a public body appropriately structured to make the necessary
types of decisions. Professor Ellis argues that the legislature did
just this for the following reasons:
Obviously, the section of the Colorado River Conserva-
tion District Act relied upon by the District was an attempt
by the Colorado legislature to delegate the power to with-
draw certain waters from the market system to the District
69 See Comment, Water Appropriation for Recreation, supra note 44, for a
brief discussion of the mechanics of appropriation of the free-flow.
70 "The admini trator is needed only when the question relates to what is
good for others who are not in a position to affect the individuals decision, be-
cause they are not parties to the transaction. Such a question is obviously one
that the individual should not decide." Trelease, Policies for Water Law, Property
Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulation, 5 NAT. RES. J. 1, 39 (1965).
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in which those streams are located. The District would seem
to be an excellent choice for the delegation of this power.
It is concerned with all aspects of water use and not just
protection of fish, or conservation. Its board of directors is
made of citizens of the counties within its jurisdiction, the
men who represent the localities that would be most affected
by the preservation of natural streams, as well as by the detri-
mental effects of withdrawing their water from the market."7 1
The District relied on § 150-7-5- (10) of its enabling act which
gave it the power to "file upon and hold for the use of the public
sufficient water of any natural stream to maintain a constant
stream flow in the amount necessary to preserve fish, and to use
such water in connection with retaining ponds for the propaga-
tion of fish for the benefit of the public. ' 72 This section is
ambiguous when read with the more restrictive general purpose
of the act which was "to provide for the conservation of the
Colorado River for storage, irrigation, mining and manufactur-
ing purposes and the construction of reservoirs, ditches, and
works for the purpose of irrigation and reclamation."7 3 In view
of the date of the Act's passage, 1937, it is arguable that the
legislature only intended § 150-7-5-(10) to give the district the
right to construct reservoirs and provide for minimum releases
for preservation of fish as preservation of the stream's flow for
fish and recreation was not a recognized function of water law
in 1937 when the District was established. The construction
urged by Professor Ellis, however, is perhaps more appropriate
in light of increasing recognition that preservation of the stream's
flow for fish and recreational purposes is a proper water use.
His second argument is also valid. However, this author believes
that withdrawals of water for these types of purposes should be
made according to a comprehensive state or regional water plan
which provides for both development and preservation. The
agency delegated this authority should be made up of administra-
tors and planners whose perspective is the entire state, for they are
in the best position to rationally assess both the economic and
non-economic consequences of withdrawal on the state as a whole.
71 Ellis, supra note 65, at 183.72 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 150-7-1 (1963).
7 3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 150-7-5(10) (1963).
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C. State Legislation
This section will discuss state legislation enacted to imple-
ment preservation programs, statutes which permit administrative
agencies to resolve conflict between preservation and development
in favor of preservation, and statutes which attempt to insure
that recreational uses of water will be integrated into state water
resources planning. It is necessary that public action be taken to
preserve free-flowing water for two reasons. First, the users of the
free-flow are individuals, families and small outdoor groups.
Their vote in the market place cannot be measured in dollar
amounts, e.g., how much is it worth for a family to go on a picnic
near a scenic waterfall? They also lack sufficient capital to com-
pete with other users, e.g., coal companies. Secondly, the decision
to preserve the free-flow of the stream provides future generations
with the option of allocating the stream. These future generations
are not represented in the market which tends to prefer present
to future uses. This is a clear situation where the state should
protect those people who are unable to protect their interests.
Starting in 1915 the Oregon legislature 74 began to withdraw
certain waterfalls and streams in the Columbia River basin from
appropriation in order to preserve their scenic beauty and en-
hance their recreational potential. For example, the Rogue
River was withdrawn from appropriation and any structures
which would interfere with the passage of fish were prohibited.75
Idaho has authorized the governor
to appropriate in trust for the people of the state of Idaho
all of the unappropriated water of Big Payette Lake, or so
much thereof as may be necessary to preserve said lake in
its present condition. The preservation of said water in said
lake for scenic beauty, health, and recreation purposes neces-
sary and desirable for all of the inhabitants of the state is
hereby declared to be a beneficial use of such water.y6
Wisconsin recently passed a more limited Wild Rivers Act. The
Act provides:
74 See, e.g., ORE. GFm. LAWS ch. 36 (1915), ORE. GEx. LAws ch. 279 (1929),
OnE. GEN. LAWS ch. 184 (1931). For a more detailed discussion see Bonney,
Oregon's Coordinated Integrated Water Resources Policy, 3 WIa.A~.m-rE L. J.
295, 297-98 (1965).75 O F. Gm. LAWS ch. 287 (1929).
76I ma.o CoDE ANN., § 67-4031 (1925).
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The Pike river in Marinette County, and the Pine river
and its tributary Popple river in Florence and Forest
Counties are designated as wild rivers and shall receive
special management to assure their preservation, protection
and enhancement of their natural beauty, unique recreational
and other inherent values in accordance with the guidelines
outlined in this section.77
The bill does not prohibit diversions or the construction of
impoundments but contemplates a cooperative program between
the state conservation commission, local government bodies, the
United States Forest Service, and private landowners.
These three acts represent a limited commitment to preserva-
tion of free-flowing water. They all require legislative withdrawal
of the stream from development or designation of the stream as
a wild river. There is a danger that they may come to represent
isolated preservation decisions rather than a basis for integrating
the values of free-flowing water into state-wide water and recrea-
tion planning.
At least ten states by statute recognize recreation as a bene-
ficial use of water.78 However, this does little to insure preserva-
tion of free-flowing water. First, it is not clear, as has been
mentioned earlier, if preservation of the free-flow will be classified
as a recreational use. Secondly, most states have a hierarchy of
preferences to resolve conflicts and recreation is usually one of
the lowest preferences.7 9 This means that if the supply is limited,
use of the water for recreation will not be protected if there are
other competing uses higher on the scale of preferences. More-
over, in the appropriation states, recreational use will be one
of the first to be curtailed, although its user may be senior to
the preferred user. 0 Washington comes the closest to recognizing
a preference for preservation by giving fish and game protection
7 7 Ws STAT. ANN. § 30.26(2) (1965).7 8 Am. REV. STAT. § 45-147 (1939), FLA. STAT. AN. § 373.081 (1957), GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-505 (1966), IND. STAT. ANN. § 27-1407(5) (1959), KAN. GEN.
STAT. § 82a-707 (1957), N.D. CENTuRY CODE § 61-04-02 (1957), N.Y. CON-
SERVATION LAW 401 (McKinney Supp. 1963), Omio REV. CODE ANNl. § 1525.01(d)
(1959), ORE. REv. STAT. § 536.300 (1955), TEX. Crv. STAT. § 7470 (1953). See
also State v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945) (recrea-
tion declared a beneficial use by court).7 9 See, e.g., Axuz. REV. STAT. § 45-147 (1939), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.081
(1957), IND. STAT. ANN. § 27-1407(10) (1959), KAN. GEN. STAT. § 82a-707
(1957), TEx. Crv. STAT. § 7471 (1953).




agencies a veto over diversions which adversely affect these re-
sources. The statute provides:
The supervisor of hydraulics may refuse to issue any per-
mit to divert water, or any hydraulic permit of any nature,
if, in the opinion of the director of fisheries or director of
game, such permit might result in lowering the flow of
water in any stream below the flow necessary to adequately
support food fish and game fish population in the stream.8'
Those states which require a permit to use water can preserve
free-flowing water by refusing to grant a permit on the grounds
that the public interest will be better served if the stream is not
developed. The California Water Code provides that "The board
shall reject an application when in its judgment the proposed
appropriation would not best conserve the public interest."82
The Board is to consider the public interest according to com-
prehensive state water plans which specify a variety of uses
including recreation and fish and wildlife. Although other state
statutes are not as specific in defining the considerations to be
taken into account by water administrators in deciding to grant
or deny a permit, Dean Trelease has found that in all the
Western states "except Idaho, administrators may deny the per-
mit if it would be in conflict with the public interest."8 3 However,
in those states where the use of water for recreation is not
recognized as a beneficial use, it is unlikely at the present that
the agency will find denial of a permit to be in the public
interest.
California also has the power to preserve free-flowing water
by virtue of the Department of Water Resource's power to file
applications to appropriate "any water which in its judgment is
or may be required in the development and completion of a
81
WAsH. REV. CODE § 75.20.050 (1955). See also VT. STAT. ANN. ch. 10
§ 704 (1957); CAL. SESs. LAws ch. 48 (1965).82 CAL. WAmm CODE § 1255-57 (1957). These sections are not currently
being used to preserve free-flowing water. A good example is the current con-
troversy over the middle fork of the Feather River. The middle fork is a mag-
nificent primitive river high in the Sierra Nevada Mountain Range. The Rich-
vale Irrigation District, which serves rice farmers in the Sacramento Valley,
proposed the construction of two large storage reservoirs and a series of power
generating plants on the Feather River to obtain a joint water supply. The project
was opposed by the adjoining counties and the State Department of Fish and
Game due to its adverse impact on recreation and fish and wildlife resources.
The California Water Commission and the State Water Rights Board approved
the roject rejecting values to be gained from preservation. See Reinhardt,
Shadows on the Feather, CRY CALIFo NIA 24 (Fall 1966).83 Trelease, supra note 80, at 140-41.
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general or co-ordinated plan looking toward the development,
utilization for conservation of the water resources of the state."84
The Department has filed applications on all major sources of
unappropriated water, thereby withdrawing from development
many stretches of rivers worthy of preservation. Withdrawal is
permanent until the California Water Commission, which is
responsible for state water planning, releases or assigns the state
priority "for the purpose of development not in conflict with
such general or co-ordinated plan."8 5 The California Water Com-
mission has not, however, considered preservation of free-flowing
water as part of the state wide plan.86 Tennessee does not have
withdrawal system, but does require the Water-Engineer to de-
termine which waters should be reserved for public purposes
including navigation, sanitation, recreation, maintenance of fish
and aquatic life, and maintenance of usual scenic features, and
other public purposes.8 7
The eastern states have been more diligent in recognizing
public rights to scenic beauty. States such as Iowa, s Kentucky, 9
Maryland,90 Minnesota, 91 and Mississippi, 92 allow a permit to
divert or construct a dam to be denied if it will not be in the
public interest. Since in Wisconsin the public has a right to
84 CAL. WATER CODE § 10500 (1953).
8G CAL. WATER CODE § 10504 (1959).86 See note 82 supra.
8 7 TaEN. REv. STAT. § 70-2003 (1957).88 IoWA REV. STAT. § 455.19 (1939).8 9 Ky. REV. STAT. (hereinafter cited as KRS) § 151.170(2) (1966) provides:
The director of the Division shall issue a permit to the applicant f an
investigation reveals that the quantity, time, place or rate of withdrawal
of public water will not be detrimental to the public interests or rights
of other public water users. No permit shall be denied to a responsible
applicant who has established an amount of water for which he has a
need for a useful purpose, provided the requested amount of water is
available.
The two sentences could be construed to mean that, if the Director decides it is
in the public interest to preserve a stream, then water is withdrawn from develop-
ment. The power to withdraw in the public interest is derived from an earlier
declaration that running water is now "public water of the Commonwealth."
IKRS § 151.120(1) (1966). The Department of Natural Resources does not,
however, currently recognize a public interest in the preservation of free-flowing
water. Dept. of Natural Resources, Kentucky Water Resources 29 (1965).
Kentucky includes recreational uses of water in reports on potential uses of
water but includes only a passing reference to the fact that "water can be used
for recreation as it stands.' Kentucky's Red River gorge is a beautiful primitive
watershed, but the Department of Natural Resources and the Army Corps of
Engineers are proceeding with plans to dam it and have given little considera-
toin to alternative sites.9 0 MD. REv. STAT. art. 96A, § 11-16 (1964).91 MIN. REv. STAT. § 111.02 (1927).92 MIss. REv. STAT. § 5956-04-07 (1956).
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enjoy the scenic beauty of navigable waters, a permit for a dam
can be denied if it would decrease aesthetic values of a stream.93
These statutes will insure greater protection of free-flowing water
if a comprehensive state water use plan includes designated bodies
of water as an integral part of the state's policy or if the statute
is explicit in spelling out the values which constitute "the public
interest." For example, Vermont, which provides that a permit
for a dam will not be issued if it is contrary to the public good,
requires the agency in defining the public good to consider the
"effect of the proposed project on scenic and recreational values,
upon fish and wildlife . . .upon the natural flow of the stream
below the dam. ..",4
State recreation and water development planning have tra-
ditionally been allocated to separate agencies.e5 Since these
agencies were not required to coordinate their efforts, preserva-
tion of free-flowing water was not made an integral part of
development planning. Many states require water planners to
consult with those charged with conservation of fish and wild-
life.96 It is only recently that states have enacted statutes or have
otherwise indicated that the allocation of streams for recreational
use is an integral part of state-wide planning. For example, the
Massachusetts Commissioner of Natural Resources is charged
with recommending a state water policy for uses such as agri-
culture, industry, recreation, wildlife, conservation, domestic
consumption, and flood prevention. 97 Ohio requires the Chief
of the Division of Water to insure that public water projects
shall not interfere with public parks which have been dedicated
to the public for recreation and pleasure.98
Aside from eliminating the usual bureaucratic inefficiencies
93See Muench v. Public Service Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514(1952). Michigan appears to have the same rule. See Lauer, King & Zugler,
Water Law in Michigan, WATER BEsouRcEs AND HE LAw 486-91 (1958).94VT. STAT. ANN. ch. 10 § 706 (1947). See also, ch. 10 § 701 (1949).
95 See Brewer & Bordner, Organizational Alternatives For Recreational Re-
sources Management: An Analysis of State Agencies, 6 NAT. BEs. J. 560, 572(1966).
96 CAL. FisaA N GANzm CoF. § 5937. For examples of State Water-Rights
Board decisions where recreation and fish and wildlife values have been pro-
tected, see State Water Rights Board Dec. 935 (1959) ("The Board finds that
the flows released will adequately protect the recreational values and scenic
qualities of the river"); Dec. 893 (1959); Dec. 898 (1958).97 MAss. STAT. ch. 21 § 9 (1966).98Omo REv. STAT. § 1523.01 (1956).
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which result from two or more departments acting on related
matters without co-ordination, planning for preservation should
be integrated with development planning for several reasons.
First, most resources agencies are concerned with a limited
number of values concerning use of the resource. They are
seldom structured to consider all potential uses of a resource.
Thus, decisions tend to reflect a choice among a limited number
of alternatives rather than among all potential alternatives.
Secondly, administrators tend to formulate their own conception
of the public interest which produces a fixed pattern of decisions,99
thus they are often slow in reflecting changes in public values.
Finally, implicit in the notion of co-ordinated planning is that
decisions will be made only after full examination of all relevant
alternative uses. As a practical matter this will not automatically
occur merely by enacting a statute directing that it be done.
Diverse viewpoints should be institutionalized into the decision-
making process. Mississippi has done this by a statute which
requires that at all times the Board of Water Commissioners
must be composed of at least one person "well versed in each of
the major types of water users ... recreational, industrial, munici-
pal, and agricultural."'' 1
A state program designed to encourage preservation of free-
flowing water should include: (1) a mandate to the water re-
sources agency to prepare in conjunction with recreation and
fish and wildlife agencies an analysis of all streams which have
scenic, recreational, and fish and wildlife values which might
merit preservation; (2) a requirement that a state-wide water
plan designating selected streams for preservation be developed;
(3) a requirement in those states which regulate diversions that
the decision to grant or deny a permit be made in accordance with
the comprehensive water plan; (4) designation of preservation of
the free-flow as a beneficial use; (5) a requirement that at least
one member of the decision-making body represent the public
recreational interests; (6) authorization to the water resources
99 See Reich, The Public and the Nation's Forests, 50 CA.. L. BEwv. 381, 404(1962).
100 Miss. STAT. § 5956-08 (1956). See also NLw Yonx CONSERVATON LAW
§ 401 (at least one member of the four advisory members to the water resources
commission must be familiar with the use of water for water-fowl), CoNN. STAT.
§ 25-1 (1957).
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agency to withdraw water from development for public use or to
make such recommendations to the legislature; and (7) guidelines
which would require the agency to formulate a program to con-
trol development along the banks and which would give it the
necessary power to implement its program, e.g., the right to
acquire access rights and scenic easements.
Before a state may withdraw a river or stream for the purpose
of preserving the free-flow, it must satisfy the constitutional pro-
hibition against the taking of property without due process of law.
Does withdrawal, which prevents future diversion and destroys
vested property rights, constitute such a taking? The answer may
vary depending on whether the state follows the law of riparian
rights or prior appropriation.
The proposed comprehensive water-planning statute described
above, would not be unconstitutional in the appropriation states.
From the time of statehood these states have asserted some form of
"ownership" interest in water in order that use may be regulated
in the public interest. This has enabled them to prefer one proj-
ect to another.1°1 An eminent authority has asserted that water
can be withdrawn from general appropriation to preserve scenic
and recreational values.10 2
A more serious problem arises in the riparian states. Two
situations obtain today: first there are states which have recently
asserted public "ownership"' 0 3 of water and secondly, there are
those which still adhere to the common law doctrines. It will be
argued that in all riparian states rights are vested by virtue of
ownership of riparian land not by actual use and thus any legisla-
tion which curtails future uses is unconstitutional. Consequently,
courts have held that any curtailment of the right of future use
of the water is unconstitutional.
It is submitted that courts today will not hold withdrawal un-
constitutional even in riparian states where no public ownership
statute has been enacted. Applying the accepted test for an un-
constitutional taking through regulation-whether the means
101 See Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1948). The best
discussion of the ownership theory is Trelease, Government Ownership and
Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAr. L. REv. 638 (1957).
'
02 Hutchns, Background and Modem Developments in Water Law in the
United States, 2 NAT. R~s. 1. 416, 422 (1912).
103 See, e.g., KRS § 151.120 (1966).
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chosen by the legislature bear a reasonable relationship to ends
sought to be accomplished-courts will hold that the means (with-
drawal) does bear a reasonable relationship to the end (preserva-
tion) because it has been determined that preservation is a
reasonable use.
Furthermore there is increasing recognition that the adjudica-
tion of private claims is unable to achieve an optimum allocation
of a scarce resource and that the legislature is in the best position
to do so. The Oregon scheme of modification of riparian rights
suggests a constitutional two-stage process that legislatures may
follow. The legislature should first declare that vested rights will
be recognized only in water which has been put to reasonable use
for a period of time prior to the effective date of the statute and
that after that date water use shall be subject to state regulation.10 4
Arguably, this would theoretically put riparian states on the same
theoretical footing as appropriation states. In the alternative, a
legislature could adopt the rationale that the state should compen-
sate all individuals whose uses must be curtailed and thus pur-
chase both existing and developmental rights of various users




Federal decisions for preservation or development of rivers are
initally made by administrative bodies, the most significant of
which are the Federal Power Commission, the Bureau of Re-
clamation, and the Army Corps of Engineers. The Federal Power
Commission [hereinafter referred to as FPC] grants licenses to
private individuals, municipalities, and states for the construction
of dams on navigable waterways or on non-navigable waterways
which traverse public lands. The Bureau of Reclamation and the
Army Corps of Engineers plan public projects to be built pursuant
to congressional authorization. Primarily, this section will discuss
10 4 TnE OREGON WATER CODE OF 1909 was upheld in In re Hood River,
114 Ore. 112, 227 Pac. 1065 (1924). For a discussion of this statute and other
police power problems, see King, Regulation of Water Rights Under the Police
Power, WATER REsouRcEs Amu mm LAw 271 (1958).0 5 Krasnowiechi & Paul, The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan
Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 199-202 (1961).
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the FPC and the Bureau of Reclamation.
The FPC has the power to deny a license for economically
feasible projects which threaten a river's scenic value, but seldom
exercises it to preserve free-flowing water. The authority to con-
sider the impact of their decision on the aesthetic values of the
river is derived from § 10 (a) of the Federal Power Act, which pro-
vides that any project
shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission will be
best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or de-
veloping a water way for the use or benefit of interstate or
foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of
water power, and for other beneficial uses including recrea-
tion.106
The last phrase of this section is the only directive authorizing the
Commission to expand its horizons beyond determining whether
the project is financially feasible and suited to the long range
economic needs of the river basin. The phrase "including recrea-
tion" was added in 1935, but legislative history provides little in-
sight into its intended scope.107
The early cases reviewing FPC decisions permit the agency
wide discretion in exercising its authority, except in those in-
stances where Congress has specifically restricted it. In Chapman
v. FPC,0 8 the Secretary of Interior challenged a license for a
hydro-electric dam on the grounds that congressional approval of
a comprehensive plan for the development of the river basin re-
moved all power sites from FPC jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
held that congressional approval of studies submitted by the
Department of Interior and the Army Corp of Engineers and sub-
sequent authorization of some dams did not constitute a with-
drawal of all other sites. Congress merely intended that the dams,
10648 Stat. 1068, 16 U.S.C. 803(a) (1958).
107 This phrase was one of several amendments added in 1935, but the re-
port accompanying them only notes that the Commission may now consider other
beneficial uses of the river, including recreation. The other amendments to
section 10 indicate a Congressional intent to broaden the Commission's mandate to
plan comprehensively. Prior to the 1935 amendments, the Commission could only
consider the project's impact on navigation; however, the additional amendments
directed them to also consider its impact on interstate and foreign commerce. See
S. R P. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45 (1935). The sentence previously
read in part: "scheme of improvement and utilization for the purposes of navi-
gation, of water power development, and other beneficial public uses."1083 95 U.S. 153 (1952).
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private or public, be constructed pursuant to a comprehensive
plan. In National Hell's Canyon Association v. FPC,0 9 the Com-
mission licensed a low dam to be constructed by a public utility
rather than the high dam proposed by the Bureau of Reclama-
tion. This led to a bitter struggle between advocates of private and
public power. The court reiterated that the mere existence of a
public development plan did not preclude issuance of a license,
and approved the commission's judgment that development of the
Middle Snake should not be frozen for an indeterminable period
in the future.
These cases indicate that the battle for preservation must be
won within the Commission. Congress, by enactment of the
Federal Power Act, has delegated to the Commission authority to
coordinate national power development. As a corollary, no sites
have been withdrawn from development except those designated
by Congress or the FPC. The effect of contrary holdings in the
Chapman and National Hell's Canyon cases would be to permit
government bodies other than Congress and the FPC to decide
that a site had been withdrawn from consideration. Thus, ef-
fective preservation of free-flowing water must come either
through affirmative congressional action withdrawing water from
development, or from a modification of the Federal Power Act
to make preservation a major consideration in certain license
proceedings.
The FPC has two methods of preserving the free-flow or a
portion of it: (1) it may condition a license to require the release
of minimum flows to protect fish life in the stream, (2) it may
deny the license because use of the river for fish and wildlife,
scenic enjoyment, and recreation is adjudged its highest use.110
The Commission often will condition a license to require
construction of fish preservation facilities or minimum releases
of water to sustain fish life, but it is clear that these considera-
tions are secondary to insurance of an adequate power supply.
State of Washington v. FPC"' is a good example of the relative
109237 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 852 U.S. 924 (1957),
rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 978 (1957).
"o For a general discussion of FPC licensing, see Note, Federal Power
Commission Control Over River Basin Development, 51 VA. L. REv. 663 (1965).
111207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954). For a
description of the entire litigation, see MANrnsr.a, MANAGING OuR URBAN
ENVmoNimNT, 61-66 (1966). The federal-state conflicts in the litigation are
discussed in Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REv. 1, 58-65 (1966).
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values the Commission assigns to power and preservation of fish
life. The City of Tacoma was licensed to construct two dams on
a tributary of the Columbia River. The State of Washington,
along with numerous sportsman's organizations, opposed the dam
because of its impact on salmon. The license was denied because
the FPC examiner believed that there was a conflict between
such dam construction and the comprehensive plan for the
development of the Columbia River in that the dam was not
adapted to other beneficial uses including recreation and given
this fact the economic necessity for this power was outweighed by
preservation of anadromous fish runs. The Commission reversed
its examiner and the ninth circuit affirmed. The court held, on
the authority of First Iowa Hydro-Electric,12 that the city was not
subject to state laws inconsistent with the license terms113 and then
followed the substantial evidence rule to sustain the decision. The
court noted that the ladder and steelhead provided for the salmon
was 258 and 118 feet higher than the highest ladders over which
fish had previously passed, but dryly concluded "If the dams
will destroy the fish ... we are powerless to prevent it.""1 Denial
of a license which threatens fish life has been confined to the situa-
tion where the financial feasibility of the project was in question,
apart from its impact on fish life, and the apparent hazards to fish
resources.'15
The Federal Power Commission now includes as a standard
article in each license that
The licensee shall construct, maintain and operate .. .such
fishways... or other fish handling facilities or fish protective
devices and supporting facilities for artifical propagation and
comply with such reasonable modifications of the project
structures, and operation in the interest of fish life as may be
prescribed hereafter by the Federal Power Commission upon
its own motion or upon the recommendations of the Secretary
112 328 U.S. 152 (1946) (FT license is not subject to state law preventing
trans-basin diversion).
113 The city failed to comply -with three provisions of Washington law:
(1) the necessity to obtain a permit from the State Supervisor of Hydraulics for a
diversion, (2) the necessity to obtain written approval for fish protection plans
from the Directors of Fisheries and Game, and (3) a statute prohibiting the
construction of dams over twenty-five feet high on the river. 207 F.2d at 393.
114 207 F.2d at 398.
115 See, e.g., Public Utility Dist. No. 1, 32 F.P.C. 444 (1964). Note, Fed-
eral Power Commission Control Over River Basin Development, 51 VA. L. REv.
663, 667 (1965).
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of the Interior, or the [State] Department of Fish and Game,
after notice and opportunity for hearing and upon a finding
based on substantial evidence that modifications are de-
sirable, and consistent with the provisions of the Act.116
Recent FPC opinions indicate that conditions such as the re-
lease of minimum flows are an essential part of many projects.117
The Secretary of Interior often intervenes in licensing pro-
ceedings because of the project's adverse effect on fish and wild-
life. If the Secretary's intervention is successful, greater preserva-
tion of free-flowing water is insured because the conditions he ad-
vocates are generally more restrictive than those proposed by the
FPC. It is unclear whether the Secretary's objections are subject
to FPC approval, thus causing him to stand in the same position
as all others who appear before the Commission, or whether he
has the power to impose license conditions regardless of FPC ap-
proval when the project affects reserved public lands under his
jurisdiction. The Secretary makes two kinds of arguments: (1) the
project as licensed is unsound because it will have a detrimental
impact on the stream's fish and wildlife, and (2) section 4 (e) of
the Federal Power Act confers upon him the power to prescribe
conditions of water quantity and quality to preserve fish and wild-
life for projects which effect government reservations."18
Section 4 (e) provides:
The Commission is authorized and empowered to issue
licenses to citizens of the United States ... except as herein
provided: Provided, that licenses shall be issued within any
reservation only after a finding by the Commission that the
license will not interfere or be inconsistent with the purposes
316 This provision for minimum releases is Standard Article 10, Form 1-2, 31
F.P.C. 528, 580 (1964). The Commission noted in its 1964 report that it was
placing more emphasis on outdoor recreation in licensing projects. 1964 F.P.C.
Rep. 69 (1964). In 1963 the Commission required as part of a license the in-
clusion of a recreational plan. See F.P.C. Order No. 260-A, 29 F.P.C. 777, 28
Fed. Reg. 4029 (1963) (which amended Federal Power Regulation § 4.4).
117 In a recent examiner's decision, the city of Denver was required to release
15 c.f.s. during irrigation season in addition to releases necessary to satisfy senior
rights, or the reservoir's inflow, whichever was less. The examiner's decision put
a gloss on section 10(a) in reasoning that the section provides for license condi-
tions which best adapt the project for beneficial uses to the public "including
recreational uses and fish and wildlife conservation." (Emphasis added.) Pre-
siding Examiner's Initial Decision on Application for Amendment of the License,
City and County of Denver, Colorado, Project No. 2204, 8 (1966).18 See, e.g., Brief of Respondent, Department of Interior, Intervenor,
Matter of Public Utility District No. 1 of Skamia County, 32 F.P.C. 444 (1964)(Opinion No. 440) (Brief on file with Ky. LJ.).
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for which such reservation was created or acquired, and shall
be subject to and contain such conditions as the Secretary of
the Department under whose supervision such reservation
falls shall deem necessary for the adequate protection and
utilization of such reservation." 9
The Secretary argues that this section is concerned with conflicts
over use of natural resources, and that Congress gave the power to
resolve the policy conflicts which arise between the Federal Power
Commission and the Department of Interior to the Secretary of
Interior when the reservation falls under his supervision. The
Commission has consistently maintained that "the ultimate re-
sponsibility for the issuance of a license which would assure the
operation of a hydro-electric project in the best interests of the
public has been delegated by Congress to the Federal Power Com-
mission."' 20 In State of California v. FPC,121 the Secretary argued
that the above interpretation of § 4 (e)122 in granting a license
which provided for scheduled releases to maintain minimum flows
for the first twenty years of the license term. After this term ex-
pired, water releases would only continue if the Department of
Interior and the State of California could show that water was
available for conservation purposes and that such further releases
would not adversely affect or endanger the project's economic
feasibility. The Commission had to reconcile both the demands
made by federal and state wildlife agencies with the claims of the
water districts who objected to the minimum flow releases for
fear that their water rights might be impaired. The solution was
obviously a compromise. The court sustained the Commission's
power to "incorporate in the tendered license a condition which
could impair the districts' full use of their irrigation rights in
some future year,"123 and by treating the Secretary's argument as
a substantial evidence question, the court, by implication, seems
to have accepted the Commission's argument that the final author-
ity to resolve conflicts over license conditions designed to protect
wildlife rests with the FPC. However, the case is a step toward
11949 Stat. 839, 16 U.S.C. 797(e) (1958).
120 City and County of Denver, Project 2204, supra note 117, at 8.
121 345 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1965).122 See Brief of Respondent, United States of America on the Relation of
Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior v. Federal Power Commission, 345
F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1965) (Brief on file with Ky. L.J.).
123 345 F.2d at 924.
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greater preservation of minimum flows because the court accepted
the argument that the FPC has the discretionary power to compel
investor-owned utilities to make substantial sacrifices to finance
fish protection facilities and to guarantee minimum flows for the
maintenance of fish resources. 1 24
California v. FPC illustrates the difficult questions which
arise when preservation of the free-flow conflicts with other uses
of the water. There is merit to the Commission's position that one
agency ought to be charged with resolving these conflicts, and that
it is best suited since it is the "guardian of the public domain,"
charged with comprehensive planning for water development.
However, the danger in this position is that substantial invest-
ments by federal and state governments in fish and wildlife re-
sources may be lost if the Secretary is denied the power to condi-
tion licenses since this is the only governmental agency whose pri-
mary purpose is the preservation of fish and wildlife resources.
This unstable relationship between the Secretary and the FPC
suggests that often there are conflicts between federal policies
which encourage the propagation of fish and wildlife and those
which encourage hydro-electric development. It is unrealistic to
think that an agency charged with development will be the most
sensitive to preservation of fish and wildlife. Congress should take
a fresh look at the problem and decide if hydro-electric power is
still to be preferred to preservation of fish life. Then it can affirm
the Commission's present authority or give the Secretary of In-
terior power to condition licenses when fish life under his
jurisdiction is threatened.
If the Commission has decided that the highest use is a stream's
preservation, then it can exercise its discretion and deny the
license. Such discretion with respect to scenic and recreational
values rests in § 10 (a), which was construed in Namekagon Hydro
Corp. v. FPC125 to allow denial of a license for a project that was
economically feasible but would have destroyed one of the last
white-water canoe areas in Wisconsin. The court noted that it was
the policy of Wisconsin to try and preserve its few remaining
stretches of free-flowing water, and reasoning "Under Sec. 10 (a)
124See 28 F.P.C. 375 (1962); 14 F.P.C. 518, 556 (1955); 5 F.P.C. 689,
595, 903 and 1003 (1946); and 2 F.P.C. 392 (1941), for decisions imposing
,ubstantial burdens on licenses to maintain fish life and recreation.125 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954).
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of the Act that it was the Commission's responsibility to protect
the public interest," concluded "there was substantial evidence
and a rational basis for the Commission's finding of existing
unique recreational value in the lower 22 mile stretch of the
Namekagon River which should be preserved."'1
2 6
This case is a major recognition that scenic values should be
incorporated into the natural resources decision-making process.
The decision suggests two guidelines for future FPC decisions.
First, the FPC should assess the impact of its decisions on a
state's recreational policy. However, this should not be determina-
tive since many states place little value on preservation of free-
flowing water and have as yet failed to formulate comprehensive
recreation plans. Secondly, the public interest requires that the
FPC establish criteria for determining when preservation of the
free-flow should be considered the highest use of the stream. The
FPC has not explicitly done this, but in 1964 they began river
basin studies which will give some consideration to preservation
of the free-flow and more consideration to alternative develop-
ment sites when scenic and wildlife values are threatened. In
the High Mountain Sheep'2 7 case the Commission was required to
choose between two dam sites on the Snake River in Washington:
the High Mountain Sheep site above the confluence of the Snake
and Salmon, a major fishing stream in Idaho, and the Nez Perce
site below the confluence. The latter would destroy the Salmon as
a fishing stream. Considerable political pressure was placed on the
Commission from the State of Idaho and sportsman's groups. The
Commission found that the Nez Perce site had three economic ad-
vantages over High Mountain Sheep but chose the latter because
it had the "decisive advantage" of not interfering with fishing
runs on the Salmon. However, the major factor causing this de-
cision was apparently the fact that the power advantages of the
Nez Perce were slight compared to High Mountain Sheep.12s The
Commission attempted to justify its decision in light of the City of
Tacoma case saying "That the balancing of equities in light of the
relative importance of the two claims on our natural resources in
126 Id. at 512.
127 Pacific Northwest Power Co., 31 F.P.C. 247 (1964).
128 Note, Federal Power Commission Control Over River Basin Development,
supra note 115, at 677.
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a particular case must be determinative.' 29 The High Mountain
Sheep decision, however, seems inconsistent with the approach
taken by the FPC in City of Tacoma. There, the Commission did
not seriously consider the State of Washington's well enunciated
policy against dams which impair and destroy fish life, 30 while in
High Mountain Sheep the Commission appears to have been much
more sensitive to Idaho's policy of preserving its scenic and fish
resources for recreation.131 State law should not be allowed to
frustrate comprehensive federal planning, but in situations such
as High Mountain Sheep the FPC should respect a well-defined
state interest in non-development especially when alternative
development sites or sources of power are available.
The decision to inquire into the availability of alternative sites
has been left to the FPC's discretion. However, a 1965 Second
Circuit Court decision indicates that the courts are increasingly
willing to supervise the FPC by specifying the situations in which
they will be required to undertake exhaustive, rather than pro
forma, investigations of alternative sites when scenic areas are
threatened. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC132 in-
volved Consolidated Edison of New York's decision to build a
pump storage plant near historic Storm King Mountain on the
Hudson River. An unincorporated association of towns and con-
cerned citizens groups was formed to protest the project because
of its adverse impact on the river and its banks. The Commission's
initial response from conservationist pressure was to set a rigorous
conservation standard for itself. "If on this record Consolidated
Edison has available an alternative source of power for meeting
its power needs which is better adapted to development of the
Hudson River for all beneficial uses, including scenic beauty, this
application should be denied."'133 Nonetheless, the Commission
denied the license. On appeal the second circuit reversed, ruling
that the petitioners had standing to contest the license' 34 and that
129 31 F.P.C. 247, 263-64.
130The Columbia River Sanctuary Act, ch. 9 § 1, State of Washington Laws of
1949, prohibited dams on the river in question and tributaries of the Columbia
over 25 feet high.
131 See Hearings at 499-501 (statement of Hon. Robert E. Smythe, Gov-
ernor of Idaho).
132 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
133 Id. at 612.
134See Reich, The Public and the Nation's Forests, supra note 99, at 381;
Note, Standing to Sue and Conservation Values, 88 CoLo. L. REv. 391 (1966).
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the FPC had an affirmative duty to protect the public interest by
assuring that economic and non-economic factors were considered
in licensing proceedings 35 and that this duty could only be dis-
charged by seriously considering alternative sources of power. The
court found no meaningful evidence contradicting the proffered
testimony "supporting the use of gas turbines as an alternative
source of power,"' 36 and remanded for further hearings which
began after the Supreme Court denied certiorari. The Court's
directions to the FPC for the new hearings was specific: "The Com-
mission's renewed proceedings must include as a basic concern the
preservation of natural beauty and of national historic shrines,
keeping in mind that, in our affluent society, the cost of the pro-
ject is only one of several factors to be considered."
The Scenic Hudson decision raises a number of questions.
First, when must the FPC consider alternative proposals because
of the project's impact on the natural beauty of the area? Second,
how much weight is to be given to natural beauty? Third, what is
the extent of the inquiry required of the FPC? For example, if
the alternative project is more costly to the licensee, how much of
a cost differential can he be made to bear in order to preserve
scenic beauty? Finally, must the complaint prove the FPC failed to
discharge their duty to inquire into alternative sites or must the
FPC prove its duty was discharged? There are no easy answers to
these questions. Currently, Scenic Hudson only suggests a new
method for making natural resources decisions and for judicial
review of them, rather than establishing workable guidelines for
future decisions. 37 However, there are indications that courts will
broadly construe Scenic Hudson and devise new doctrines for pro-
tecting scenic beauty.
For example, in Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife
Preserves, Inc.13s an interstate natural gas pipeline company
sought, pursuant to the Natural Gas Act, to condemn a portion of
135 "In this case, as in many others, the Commission has claimed to be the
representative of the public interest. This role does not permit it to act as an
umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it, the
right of the public must receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of
the Commission." 354 F.2d at 620.
136 Id. at 624.
137The impact of Scenic Hudson on judicial review of administrative deci-
sions has just begun to be assessed. The trail-breaking study is Reich, The
Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L. J. 1227 (1966).
18s 225 A.2d 180 (N.J. 1966) (per curiam opinion).
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land held by a private charitable corporation engaged in the
acquisition of wildlife refuges. The Company had the power to
condemn the property but the court abandoned the traditional
attitude on non-review of the parcel selected by the condemnor
because they were troubled by the fact that government agencies
have become so diverse that they tend to work at cross purposes.
The court placed the refuge into a special classification-"lower
than that of a public utility, but higher than that of an ordinary
land owner who puts his land to conventional use"' 39-because of
a public interest in the preservation of a wildlife refuge. Thus, the
public interest in these kinds of values demands that route
selection decisions not be made arbitrarily.140 Relying on Scenic
Hudson, the court explicitly shifted the burden of proof to the
pipeline company holding that if arbitrariness was proven, then
"the burden of going forward with the evidence will shift to"
the company to prove that even though the proposed alternative
might be more expensive, public convenience and necessity did
not require its selection.
Scenic Hudson should not be read so narrowly as to reverse the
Commission for failing to follow the rigorous conservation stand-
ard set for itself. Scenic Hudson and Texas Eastern Transmission
are premised on the assumption that the laws which govern the
allocation of our natural resources have a limited definition of the
public interest which tends to predetermine the resolution of use
conflicts. Existing laws are based on the assumption that the public
interest is best served if development is regulated so as to insure
that there is no waste of public resources or funds and that
speculation is controlled. These laws were formulated when there
was a threat that our natural resources would fall into private
hands and thus be forever lost to the public.14 1 The problem to-
day is whether government regulation of development will con-
tinue to be our major policy, or whether there is to be greater
recognition of the public's need for preservation of scenic beauty.
Recognition of these values can, in part, come from forcing the
139Id. at 134.
140 Arbitrariness was defined as the failure of the court to allow the refuge
to prove: (1) serious damage would result to the refuge if the pipeline were
installed, and (2) that reasonable alternatives exist which will avoid serious dam-
age to the refuge. 225 A.2d 130 (N.J. 1966).14 1 See UDALL, THE QuIET CwRsis 81-158 (1963) for a summary of the
development of regulation for conservation of our natural resources.
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decision-makers to have a broader perspective. The search for
alternatives is one means of doing this, as it may tend to insure
that the agency will give greater consideration to those values
which are not usually represented by the interests appearing be-
fore it.
The desirability of placing such a burden on the FPC, thus
making preservation of scenic beauty a primary rather than sub-
sidiary consideration in appropriate licensing proceedings, should
ultimately be decided by Congress since it necessitates a review
of our national power policy. It should be determined if scenic
beauty can be preserved without preventing continued economic
growth, which is dependent on adequate energy sources. Clearly,
hydroelectric power is diminishing as a major energy source. In
1964 the Federal Power Commission estimated that by 1980 only
twenty-seven per cent of the energy output in the Far West would
be supplied from hydroelectric units.142 The trend is toward steam
generating units or fossil fuels and geothermal steam.143 In the
East, coal will be increasingly used for the generation of electri-
city. The development of nuclear power will do much to make
dams obsolete. 144 In recent years it has been asserted that develop-
ment of this source will be slow since power could not be pro-
duced at competitive rates. This prediction seems to have proven
groundless.
Our national power policy as reflected in the Federal Power
Act has not yet accounted for the shift away from dependence on
hydroelectric power. Section 10 (a) should be amended to provide
that the FPC shall grant a license when a project would im-
pair the unique, scenic, recreational, and fish and wild life
qualities of the river only after they have shown that no alternative
development sites or sources of power are available. The standard
of uniqueness is admittedly vague, but the courts have shown it
to be operative. It can be argued that each river is unique, just as
the common law deems each parcel of land unique, however, it is
unlikely that courts will go to this extreme. Probably, they will
42 F.P.C., FEDPLm Powvcn SxRVEy 117 (1964).
14 3 See Brooks, Legal Problems of the Geothermal industryj, 6 NAT. RF-s. J.
511 (1966) for a discussion of the potential uses of geothermal energy and pro-
posed regulatory legislation.
144 See U.S. Department of Interior, Pacific Southwest Water Plan VI-16
(1963). Glen T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, predicts
that "within thirty-five years all new private power plants will be operating on
nuclear energy." N.Y. Times, May 17, 1965, § 1, p. 34, col. 2.
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formulate their criteria by comparing the river on which the
proposed project will be built with other rivers in the surrounding
area because the object of the proposed amendment would be to
preserve the best examples of primitive watershed areas. Experts,
such as biologists, geologists and historians, should be able to
provide the needed guidance. The standards should also impose a
sufficient burden on those contesting licenses to deter unmeri-
torious interventions.
The Army Corp of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation
construct dams and other water projects pursuant to congressional
authorization. The agency's decision to seek congressional authori-
zation is generally made after calculating the proposed project's
cost-benefit ratio.145 This is done by comparing project and as-
sociated costs with primary project and attributable secondary
benefits. 14 If the ratio of benefits to costs is in excess of one-to-one
the project is deemed feasible. The ratio theoretically serves two
functions: (1) it provides an objective formula for determining
the project's financial feasibility, and (2) a formula for choosing
among competing projects by determining which use of water has
the greatest marginal utility.
Use of the cost-benefit ratio tends to insure that development
of a river will not be deferred to preserve its free-flow. The Corps
and the Bureau of Reclamation are in the dam building business
and committed to the concept of multiple resource use and thus
are not reluctant to recommend some from of development. Their
broad definitions of benefits make all projects feasible except -some
145See GOLZE, RECLAmATION N THE UnED STATES 128-29 (1959).
146 Proposed Practices for Economic Analysis of River Basin Projects, REPoRT
ON EVALUATION STANDARDS TO THE INTER AGENCY COmiTTEE ON WATm RE-
souRcEs (1958). This is known as the Green Book. Green Book p. a. defines them
as follows:
Project costs are the value of the goods and services (land, labor and
materials) used for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the
project together with the value of any net induced adverse effects
whether or not compensated for.
Associated costs are the value of the goods and services needed, over
and above those included in the project costs, to make the immediate
products or services of the project available for use or sale.
Primary project benefits, or primary benefits attributable to a project,
are the value of products or services directly resulting from the project,
not of all associated costs incurred in their realization.
Attributable secondary benefits are the secondary benefits attributable
to a project from a national public point of view and are the values added
over and above the value of primary benefits after taking account of
expected conditions throughout the economy with and without the project.
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small ones. Attributable secondary benefits are defined from a
public viewpoint as those "values added over and above the value
of primary benefits after taking account of expected conditions
throughout the economy with and without the project." This
definition has enabled the Bureau of Reclamation to deem a pro-
ject feasible by including benefits such as the increased flow of
wealth into the area served by the project and the stabilization of
clean, upright rural communities. 147 Thus, it is clear that the
cost-benefit ratio is not an objective formula but a decision-making
tool which masks a number of policy objectives.
Thus, there are two bases for making decisions to preserve
free-flowing water within the present administrative framework.
Some economists have suggested that the intangible benefits to be
gained from preservation can be quantified and thus integrated in-
to the cost-benefit ratio,148 while others have concluded "It would
seem more natural to regard recreation facilities as a form of col-
lective durable consumption goods, like statutes of public men,
which are valued primarily for their own sake and not as a means
toward an economic end."' 49 It has been asserted that dollar
value of a recreational project can theoretically be computed by
determining the "value added" to the local economy and the
value of the recreational experience to the user.150 This pre-
supposes highly developed economic models, but present day
recreational economists simply do not know how to assign dollar
values to many of the benefits allegedly arising from use of free-
flowing water. For example, what is the value of the canoeist
whose canoe is overturned? Thus, for the immediate future,
preservation decisions should not be made on economic criteria
alone. Instead, these decisions should represent informed judg-
147 See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Interior and Reclamation of
the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, on the Upper Colorado
River Storage Project. H. 3383, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 455 (1955). Secondary
benefits for the Central Utah unit included the increased income to local business-
men and the stabilization of local and regional economies.
148See Kelso, Discussion, Economics in Outdoor Recreation Policy, Water
Resources and Economic Development of the West, Joint Conference Proceed-
ings: Committee on Economics of Water Resource Development of the Western
Agricultural Economics Research Council and the Western Farm Economics
Association, 12-13 (1962).
149 See Hammond, Convention and Limitation in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 6
NAT. REs. J. 195, 215 (1966).
15oFor a more extended discussion and citation of authority, see Trelease,
Policies for Water Law, Property Rights, Economic Forces and Public Regulation,
5 NAT. Il.s. J. 1, 18-23 (1965).
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ments as to which public values are worthy of recognition and
protection.
Nonetheless, the advocate of preservation asks that the present
economic value of water be ignored in order to reserve it for
present and future enjoyment on the basis of unquantifiable
value judgments. This may be the equivalent of demanding a sub-
sidy since it asks those not using the free-flowing stream to bear
part of the cost of its preservation for the benefit of those who do.
Thus, it becomes important to know the "cost" of the preservation
decision; this is determined by comparing the benefits to be gain-
ed from alternative uses of the stream. This analysis may find pre-
servation as the highest economic value of the stream, or that
society desires to grant the subsidy regardless. However, attempts
to base natural resources allocation decisions expressly on "values
involved or foregone" should help to provide a more objective
basis for decision-making than now exists.' 51
B. Proposed Federal Legislation
Proposed federal wild rivers legislation envisions an integrated
program of water and land management to control diversions and
shoreline developments along designated streams flowing through
both public and private lands. The inherent power to create the
system comes from the property and general welfare clauses of the
United States Constitution. Most of the areas which will be in-
cluded in the system, especially in the west, will be located on
public lands. Article four, section three of the Constitution gives
Congress virtually unlimited power to decide the purposes for
which public lands may be used.' 52 Such purposes unquestionably
include recreational use. The proposed legislation also provides
for acquisition of private lands. There is no constitutional com-
plication since the general welfare clause allows Congress to ex-
pend federal funds to acquire land for public use. 53
A national wild rivers program is necessary if a significant
number of rivers on public lands are to be preserved in their free-
151 Clawson & Knetsch, Outdoor Recreation Research: Some Concepts and
Some Suggested Areas of Study, 3 NAT. txs. J. 250, 266 (1963).
152 United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940).
15 3 See Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958) (Congress
may promote the general welfare by large scale expenditures of public funds for
reclamation projects).
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flowing condition. The federal government has historically set
aside large amounts of the public domain for public enjoyment
through the national park and forest system but has generally
provided that water project developments such as reservoirs may
be consistent with the purpose of the park or forest.15 4 In 1964 a
national wilderness preservation system was created to preserve
portions of the national park and forest system "where earth and
its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man him-
self is a visitor who does not remain,"'155 but the statute also pro-
vided that the President could authorize the construction of water
projects within wilderness areas in the national forests. 5 6
The first comprehensive programs for the preservation of free-
flowing water were introduced in Congress in 1964 and 1965; 157
Senate Bill 1446 and House Bill 14922 were the major bills. They
proposed the establishment of a national wild rivers system on
existing public lands and a program for the addition of other pub-
lic and private lands and rivers to the system. This legislation was a
response to the 1961 Senate Select Committee on National Water
Resource's recommendation that "certain streams be preserved in
their free-flowing condition because their natural, scenic, scientific,
aesthetic, values outweigh their value for water development and
control purposes now and in the future." In 1962 the Outdoor
Recreation Resources Review Commission recommended that
further studies be undertaken to identify rivers having these
values. In 1963, a wild rivers study team was established by the
Departments of Agriculture and Interior for this purpose. 58
154See, e.g., 40 Stat. 1178 (1919), 16 U.S.C. § 227 (1958), which permits
the Secretary of the Interior to authorize reclamation projects in the Grand
Canyon "Whenever consistent with the primary purposes of said park ..
64 Stat. 853 (1950), 16 U.S.C. § 406 (d) (5) (1958) (Grand Teton National
Park); and 41 Stat. 1353 (1921), 16 U.S.C. § 797(a) (Supp. 1966), which pro-
vides that the FPC must have specific Congressional approval to license a project
within a national park or monument.
15578 Stat. 890 (1964), 16 U.S.C. 1131 (c) (Supp. 1966). For a discus-
sion of the wilderness system, see Note, National Wilderness Preservations Bill:
A Question of Values, 7 UTAH L. REv. 107 (1960).15678 Stat. 893 (1964), 16 U.S.C. 1133 (d) (4) (Supp. 1966). The Na-
tional Park Service Wilderness Management Criteria state that water development
projects are not acceptable in a wilderness area and "where these activities are
authorized, by statute, the area in question will be recommended for wilderness
only with the provision that such authorization be discontinued."
15T Legislation in the 89th Congress consisted of S. 1446, H.R. 8630, H.R.
11395, H.R. 12797, H.R. 14922. In the 90th Congress, 1st. Sess., the legislation
is still pending. S. 1092, H.R. 6588.158 See Hearings at 19 for a brief history of federal wild rivers planning.
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Senate Bill 1446 begins with a policy statement that some
free-flowing rivers have unique values and "The Congress finds
that our established national policy of dam and other construction
at appropriate sections of the rivers of the United States needs to
be complemented by a policy which would preserve other selected
rivers or sections thereof in their free-flowing condition. ... ."9
Section 2 is the first legislative recognition that our national water
resources policy should also include non-developmental values.
The emphasis on "some of the free-flowing rivers" and "other
selected rivers" indicates, however, that development is still the
dominant value and that preservation will be of limited scope. 160
Section 2 (b), defines the wild river area as "a stream or section
of a stream, tributary, or river-and related land area-that should
be left in its free-flowing condition, or that should be restored to
that condition. . . ." This definition is silent as to which charac-
teristics of a stream determine its classification as a wild river and
the extent of the river's watershed to be included in the area. The
Agriculture-Interior Study Team appears to have been influenced
by a 1962 article appearing in The Naturalist'6' which proposed a
four-fold classification to evaluate a river's recreational potential:
(1) wild rivers-those which are free of impoundments and ac-
cessible only by trail; (2) semi-wild rivers-those which are some-
times accessible by roads but their watershed and shoreline are not
developed; (3) semi-harnessed rivers-those which are impounded
or diverted in their lower stretches and have developed shorelines;
(4) harnessed rivers-those which are developed and characterized
by impoundments and artificial channeling. The article proposed
that classifications be made according to the following criteria:
"Environmental Effect, Populations, Success or Satisfaction, Acces-
sibility, Crowding, Research and Management, Seasons, Conflicts,
Size, Habitat, Pollution or Littering, Hazards and Barriers.' 162
The use of the stream is to be determined by giving each of these
criteria numerical values. For example, if a river receives a high
'15S. 1446, § 2 (a); H.R. 14922 § 2 (a).
160 This was made clear by H.R. 12797 § 6 (e) which provided for a Na-
tional Wild Rivers Review Board made up of the Secretaries of Interior and the
Army, the Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, and the State Governors
to engage in a continuous review of the program and to recommend modifications
to Congress when in the Board's judgment the river should be developed.
161Craighead and Craighead, Recreational Classification, Inventory and
Evaluation, Tim NATuamALST, Special Issue No. 2 (1962).
1621d. at 7.
KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
score for population and accessibility, its use as a fishing stream
may be poor, thus indicating it is better adapted for use as a
swimming and picnicking area.
The authors of the article testified before the Senate Com-
mittee and criticized Senate Bill 1446's definition of free-flowing
because it "does not adequately describe or define a wild river; it
simply defines those rivers which have not been impounded."16 3
The authors identified four major objectives of the bill: (1) to
preserve all or parts of certain virgin rivers; (2) to prevent further
development of certain rivers; (3) to reclaim segments of certain
rivers for aesthetic and recreational purposes; and (4) to practice
better land management along all the nation's rivers. To ac-
complish these objectives the authors urged that their classification
system be incorporated into the bill. Recognition of these separate
objectives would require that each category of river be administer-
ed differently. For example, there would be no shoreline develop-
ment of a wild river while greater access to the semi-wild river
would be encouraged. If these objectives are to be accomplished, it
would be preferable for Congress to give the Departments of
Agriculture and Interior specific management guidelines rather
than the broad grants of discretion contained in Senate Bill 1446.
To do otherwise would defeat the policy of the bill. For example,
in cases of inter-agency conflicts development advocates are likely
to prevail over strict preservationists.
Senate Bill 1446 initially designates six rivers as wild rivers'1
and nine more were listed for possible inclusion when
The Secretary of the Interior, and the Secretary of Agriculture
where national forest lands are involved, after consultation
with interested Federal agencies, ... with the Governors and
officials of the states in which the rivers listed below are
located . . .ascertain whether a joint Federal-State Plan is
feasible and desirable in the public interest to conserve seg-
ments of these rivers.165
Other additions to the system will originate in recommendations
to the President by the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior after
163See Hearings at 23-25.
164 The initial six rivers in S. 1446 were the Salmon, Idaho; Clearwater,
Middle Ford, Idaho; Rogue, Oregon; Rio Grande, New Mexico; Green, Wyoming;
and Suawanee, Georgia and Florida. S. 1446 § 3 (a).
165 S. 1446 § 3 (b). For a list of all rivers considered by the Study Team,
see Hearings at 127-34.
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consultation with the states and federal agencies involved in re-
creation and river basin planning. 66
This section of the bill insures that, by including certain rivers
in the bill, Congress has not automatically made all other un-
developed rivers available for development and clearly places
the decision-making function in the federal government, giving
the states no statutory right to veto a proposed inclusion. Clearly,
federal authority is necessary if any substantial amount of water
is to be preserved, especially in the West. It was clear from the
hearings that many western interests were opposed to Senate Bill
1446 or in favor of it only if wild rivers in their state were removed
from the bill. 167 Few states came forward, as did Wisconsin, to
urge the immediate inclusion of more areas.168
The strongest preservation bill was House Bill 14922, in-
troduced by Congressman Saylor of Pennsylvania, which con-
tained a threefold classification of scenic rivers similar to that
proposed by the Naturalist article. A scenic river was defined as
"a free-flowing stream, tributary, river or section thereof and the
related adjacent land area that possesses unique water conserva-
tion, scenic fish, wildlife, and outdoor recreation values."' 69 Class
I would be those rivers which were free of impoundments and
inaccessible except by trail. 170 Class II would be those rivers which
were free of impoundments with largely undeveloped shorelines
but which were inaccessible in some places by road.'71 Class III
would be those rivers which had developed shorelines and were
166 S. 1446 § 3 (c)-(e).
167 The most concerted opposition to S. 1446 came from the state of Wyom-
ing. Field hearings were held in Green River, Wyoming, on May 17, 1965. A
parade of witnesses came forward, most of them opposing inclusion of the Green
River in the proposed legislation. See Hearings at 369-99. It was argued that the
bill was unsound because it deviated from traditional policies of multiple (mean-
ing maximum) use of natural resources, Hearings at 399 (statement of Dr. H. S.
Jackm an, Wyoming Fish and Game Commission), and that it was another
example of federal government trampling on the rights of the individual citizens.
See e.g., id. at 431 (statement of John Otis Carney).168 See Hearings at 242.
169 H.R. 14922 § 2 (b) (1965).
170 H.R. 14922 § 2(b) (1) (1965). There would be few rivers in this category.
Recreation is of a wilderness type and they would be "administered to keep them
as unique areas of primitive America." Hearings at 39 (statement of Frank C.
and John J. Craighead).
17' H.R. 14922 § 2(b) (2). Recreation would not be of the wilderness type,
but recreational development sites would be kept to a minimum. See Hearings
at 39.
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readily accessible by road but may have undergone some diversions
or impoundments 1 2
The versions of the bill introduced in the House envisioned
a more positive role for the states who choose to cooperate with
the federal government. Under House Bill 14922 § 3 (g), the
governors of the states could request the President to recommend
to Congress that the state administer all or portions of a national
wild river program, if they were prepared to implement a general
state plan which would assure "the effectuation of the purposes of
the Act in perpetuity." House Bill 12797 § 4 (h) would allow the
states to preempt federal administration of an area if the state con-
demns the land for purposes of a wild river system. Local govern-
ment cooperation is encouraged by provisions that the federal
government may not exercise its power of eminent domain in
incorporated areas of counties if the purposes of the act are
furthered through a zoning ordinance approved by the appropriate
Secretary.1 3
A further spur to preservation is provided in Senate Bill 1446
by § 3 (c) which required that all project plans for river basin
development submitted to Congress by any federal agency contain
a discussion of "potential wild river areas." Further, the Secre-
taries of Agriculture and Interior are directed to "make specific
studies and investigations to determine which additional wild river
areas within the United States shall be evaluated in planning re-
ports by all federal agencies as potential alternative uses of water
and related land resources involved." Section 3 gives no indication
of the weight which must be given to the potential of the stream
as a wild river area. The impact of the section may merely be to
produce a series of reports detailing reasons against establishment
of a wild river area, given the presumption of development under
which federal agencies operate.1 4 Congress should consider re-
172 H.R. 14922 § 2(b) (3). These would be administered to encourage mass
recreation.
'7 3 H.R. 14922 §§4(d)-4(e) require the consent of county government in
which a scenic river area will be located before county owned lands can be
condemned and a commitment that the county government is prepared to imple-
ment a protection program satisfactory to the Secretary. Sec. 5(a) requires the
Secretary of Interior to assist states including scenic river areas in state-wide
recreation plans.
174 H.R. 14922 § 3(c) attempted to avoid this result by listing forty-eight
additional rivers for possible inclusion and by requiring that a recommendation
on inclusion of one third of them be made within five years after enactment, a
(Continued on next page)
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quiring the Secretaries to designate a class of wild river areas
which will not be developed unless a showing of necessity beyond
a cost-benefit ratio in excess of 1.1 is made and no feasible al-
ternative sites or substitute energy sources can be found.
The bill does not provide for public participation in the
selection process. There is no procedure where the public can
initiate action for the inclusion of a river within the system nor
is there a requirement for public hearings on proposed wild river
areas. Sections 3 (d) and (e) of Senate Bill 1446 provide only that
proposals should be developed
in consultation with the states, those federal agencies which
normally participate in the development of recreation plans
and comprehensive river basin plans, any commissions estab-
lished pursuant to interstate compacts the assigned respon-
sibilities of which would be affected, and commissions or
other bodies which may be established for the purpose of
developing a comprehensive plan for the river.
These recommendations shall be submitted to the President who
"shall submit to the Congress his recommendations for such legis-
lation as he deems appropriate." The importance of a decision for
the public to include a river in the systems and the fact that future
adminuistrations may not be as responsive to preservation values
as has been the Kennedy-Johnson administration suggests that the
public be given a right to initiate hearings on proposed areas in
order that the objectives of the bill are not threatened by ad-
ministrative inaction.175
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
recommendation on two thirds within seven years, and a recommendation on all
within ten years.
175 Section 6(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that interested
persons may appear and present their views to "any agency . . .on any issue"
unless this would interfere with the orderly conduct of public business. 60 Stat.
23, 5 U.S.C. § 100 (1958). One commentator has said of this section, "The
provision has rarely been employed in practice, and it is doubtful if it confers
on the public any enforceable rights if an agency chooses to slam the door."
Reich, The Public and the Nations Forests, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 381, 394 (1962).
Further, the Act may not apply to a federal wild rivers program because the
"rule making" sections do not apply to matters relating to public property. 60
Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1958).
The requirement of a public hearing would also be welcomed by develop-
ment interests as a more effective means of opposing additions to the system.
See Hearings at 201 (Statement of Lawrence Hobart, Legislative Director,
American Public Power Association).
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Senate Bill 1446 § 5 (d) provides:
The jurisdiction of the States and the United States over
waters of any stream included in a wild river area shall be de-
termined by established principles of law. For the purposes of
this Act, any taking by the United States of a water right that
is beneficially used at the time a wild river area is estab-
lished, that is vested under state law at that time, and that
prior to the date of this Act shall be compensable, shall en-
title the owner thereof to just compensation.
Section 5 (d) represents a decision to avoid overextending the
navigation power to acquire water rights without paying just
compensation. 76 Section 5 (d) is also a congressional declaration
that the federal government will not be bound by state water
rights doctrines which conflict with federal water-use-decisions as
this is the trend of recent Supreme Court decisions; 7 7 thus states
which do not recognize rights to the free-flow of the stream cannot
prevent federal acquisition of rights for these purposes. 78 Section
5 (d) lists three categories of water rights which cannot be taken
176 Section 5(d) seeks to accomplish the same result as recent water rights
settlement bills; the federal government must pay if consumptive rights are taken
in navigable or non-navigable waters. See S. 1636, § 3 (1965), discussed in
Morreale, Federal State Conflicts Over Western Waters-A Decade of Attempted
"Clarifying Legislation," 20 RTrrGEns L. REv. 423, 504-10 (1966). See also
Hearings at 41 (statement of Senator McGee).
177 In Oregon v. Federal Power Commission, 349 U.S. 435 (1955), it was
held that the state of Oregon could not prohibit the Federal Power Commission
from issuing a license to construct a dam where the dam did not impair any
water rights vested under state law, even though issuance of the license was
inconsistent with state law and policy for the preservation of anadromous fish.
In Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1957), the Court held that
the provisions of Reclamation Act, § 5, 32 Stat. 389 (1902), limiting the right to
receive water from a federal project to 160 acres in single ownership, could not
be modified by state law. In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), it was
held that the Secretary of the Interior has the power to apportion an interstate
stream using any formula he chooses regardless of state law regulating apportion-
ment. For a discussion of these cases and related problems see Meyers, The
Colorado River, 19 STAr. L. REv. 1 (1966); Goldberg, Interposition-Wild West
Water Style, 17 STAN. L. RPv. 1 (1964); Morreale, supra note 176 and Trelease,
Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water to People, States, and Nation, 1963
Supmmm CouRTRay. 158.
178 A national wild rivers system might be seriously threatened if western
political interests succeed in passing a law which would require state law to
control the use of water in federal projects. For the definitive treatment of recent
legislative attempts to adjust the federal-state water conflict, see Morreale, supra
note 176. For a discussion of the special problems raised for a national wild rivers
system, see id. at 469. Conversely federal law can frustrate a state reservation
program. See Oregon v. Federal Power Commission, 349 U.S. 435 (1955), and
Special Comment, Lake Tahoe: The Future of a National Asset-Land Use,
Water and Pollution, 52 CALiF. L. Ray. 563, 599-601 (1964).
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unless compensation is paid: (1) water "beneficially used," (2)
water "vested under state law," and (3) water "that prior to the
date of this act would have been compensable." There is some
evidence that the drafters intended section 5 (d) to be limited to
consumptive rights, but the language appears to be much broader.
Here one initially must distinguish between states that follow the
prior appropriation doctrine from those that follow the riparian
rights doctrine. In the prior appropriation states water is said to
be a public resource which means that the state has the right to
regulate water use. However, the right cannot be obtained until
the water has been diverted and applied to a beneficial use. Thus,
most rights which are "vested" or based on a beneficial use of
water are consumptive. A different situation may exist in the
riparian states. The prevailing doctrine is that the riparian right
is derived from ownership of the land adjacent to the stream and
thus does not depend on use as it does in the appropriation
states. 1'7 Thus, it is possible that section 5 (d) will require the
federal government to pay for non-consumptive rights if they wish
to prevent diversion because the riparian right is "vested" under
state law by virtue of ownership of the adjoining riverbank.
Section 5 (d) gives no indication of the theory under which the
free-flow of the stream will be preserved on federal lands. Lurking
behind the phrase "established principles of law" is the still un-
settled quagmire of federal-state conflict over control of this na-
tion's waters. Section 5 (d) does nothing to clarify this relationship
but apparently contemplates use of the power to reserve water for
use in connection with the purpose for which the federal lands
through which it flows are administered. It was held in Arizona
v. California'80 that the federal government has the power under
Art. IV, § 3, either through Congressional enactment or executive
order, to reserve water for use on Indian reservations, national
forests, wildlife refuges, and recreation areas. This power in the
west stems from the government's original ownership of the public
domain and consequently of all waters not appropriated pursuant
to state law as authorized by the Desert Land Act of 1877.18, The
179See Lauer, The Riparian Right as Property, Water Resources and the
Law, Univ. of Mich., (1958).
180373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963).
181 19 Stat. 377 (1877), as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1964). The act ap-
plies to Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Nevada,
(Continued on next page)
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reserved right is neither appropriative nor riparian but sui generis
and arises when the public domain is withdrawn for specific
purposes, such as an Indian reservation or wildlife refuge.182 The
cases recognizing this right have been limited to the west and an
eminent commentator has concluded that the above rationale
does not apply in those states where the Desert Land Act is inap-
plicable and further "that there is no unifying theory that
satisfactorily explains either the creation of reserved water rights
or their relationship to state-created water rights." 1 3 However,
the language in Arizona v. California does not limit the power to
federal lands in the Desert Land Act States.
As a practical matter, water reserved pursuant to a national
wild river system should not interfere greatly with existing
rights." Most of the stretches of rivers contemplated for inclusion
within the system are near the headwaters. Since the water will be
available for downstream use, the potential injury will be confined
to those cases where there are upstream users. The most important
question concerning these users is the priority date of the with-
drawal. Rights acquired prior to the withdrawal are superior to
the Federal government's rights, while subsequently acquired
rights are subordinate. Arizona v. California held that the right
arises when the reservation is established even though the water
is not used until some distant date. 85 This might be a basis for an
argument that the reservation occured when the public land, now
included in the national wild rivers system, was withdrawn from
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. For a general dis-
cussion of the history of the doctrine see Veeder, Winters Doctrine Rights Key-
stone of National Programs for Western Land and Water Conservation and
Utilization, 26 MONT. L. REv. 149 (1965). See also Goldberg, supra note 177
at 19-21.
182 "The reserved right, unlike state-created appropriative rights, does not
depend upon diversion from the stream and application to beneficial use. .. .In
time of shortage, however, it is unlike a riparian right, for it does not share in
the available supply pro rata but rather takes its place on the priority schedule
and receives water ahead of all rights of later date." See Meyers, supra note
177 at 65-66.
183 Id. at 69.
184 Teriver on which the proposed legislation will have the greatest impact
is the Green River in Wyoming. For a fifty mile segment, approximately sixty-
eight percent of the riverbank is in private ownership. Hearings at 419. However,
Secretary Udall has indicated that the Department of Interior considers the river
under-appropriated and testified "we therefore foresee no conflict between future
appropriations and the administration of the wild river area." Id. at 65. Clearly,
Secretary Udall was referring to appropriations in connection with existing
ranching operations rather than with trans-basin diversions.
185 873 U.S. at 600-01.
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entry or acquired by the government. However, the rationale of
the reservation theory is that Congress intended to reserve the
water to fulfill the purpose for which the land was withdrawn or
acquired. This should lead to the conclusion that the water
necessary to preserve the free-flow of the stream is not withdrawn
until the land is included in a national wild river system. This is
only fair to users who have acted in reliance on the continued
availability of water, since only when the federal government
establishes the concept of a wild river system is there notice that it
may claim a superior right to unconsumed water.
Other difficult questions remain under section 5 (d). For ex-
ample, Governor Hansen asked for clarification of the relation-
ship between inclusion of the Green River, The Colorado River
Compact, and The Upper Colorado River Compact, 8 6 which
together give Wyoming fourteen per cent of the 7,500,000 acre-
feet of water allocated to the Upper Basin. 87 Wyoming's share
must come from the Green River, which is presently under-appro-
priated. Proposed uses of the Green River include either the pro-
vision of water for large scale industrial development in the Green
River Valley or construction of a reservoir upstream for trans-
basin diversions to the North Platte basin in Eastern Wyoming.
Senator Church's answer was not reassuring to Wyoming but did
reflect the realities of federal water resource decision-making.
"The objective of the legislation is to prohibit the licensing of
dams or the construction of dams that would destroy the free-
flowing characteristics of the stream," but "it is always within
the power of Congress to authorize the construction of a dam on
any river, even a river included within this system, if Congress
should subsequently decide that a higher public value or higher
public interest would be served through the construction of the
dam."'88 Congress's approval of an interstate compact is not a
restriction on its power to continue to exercise full constitutional
authority to regulate the subject matter of the compact even if
it does so in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of the
compact. 80
186 Hearings at 52. The history of the two compacts and their legal problems
are detailed in Meyers, The Colorado River, supra note 177.
187 Hearings at 61.
188 Hearings at 69.
189 See King, Interstate Water Compacts, Water Resources and the Law
(Continued on next page)
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Section 5 (a) provides that "The Federal Power Commission
shall not authorize the construction, operation, or maintenance of
any dam or other project . . . in any wild river area except as
specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Interior." Secretary
Udall's comments on § 5 (a) indicate that the act recognizes the
possibility of private power development within the wild river
systems and has merely transferred the final decision-making
authority from the Commission to Congress. The Commission may
continue to hold license hearings but must obtain Congressional
ratification before a license is issued. House Bill 14922 § 6 (a)
would require Congressional authorization for any dam in-
cluded in any of the bill's proposed scenic river areas or an area
established in accordance with state law by the Federal Power
Commission, the Secretary of the Army, The Secretary of the
Interior or the Tennessee Valley Authority after enactment of
the bill. 90
The House's version of the wild river program contained
more provisions dealing with the state-federal relationship but
did nothing to clarify it. House Bill 14922 § 6 (e) provided that
"nothing in this Act shall constitute an express or implied claim
or denial on the part of the Federal Government as to exemption
from state water law." Yet § 6 (j) contains a clear assertion of
federal supremacy by providing that the jurisdiction of States over
the scenic river area remains unaffected except where it would im-
pair the purposes of the act, and § 6 (i), which provides "designa-
tion of a stream ... as a wild river area shall not be construed as a
reservation for purposes other than those specified in the Act or
in quantities greater than those necessary to accomplish those
purposes" is an application of the reservation theory to a scenic
rivers program and places no effective limits on the amounts which
can be reserved. Section 6 (i) is designed to remove the uncer-
tainty in state water planning created because state rights are sub-
ject to the federal government's power to reserve large and un-
specified amounts of water. It is ineffective. Certainty in state
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
362-63 (1958). The Upper Colorado River Compact XIX(c) provides that noth-
ing in the compact shall be construed as "affecting any rights or powers of the
United States of America . . . in or to the waters of the Upper Colorado River
system or its capacity to acquire rights in and to the use of said water." See also
Hearings at 76-77.
190 See note 154 supra.
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planning can come only if the federal government quantifies the
amounts needed at the time of the reservation. 191
The values of a wild river are generally dependent on the
relationship between the stream and its adjoining land area.
Preservation of the free-flow will accomplish little if the shore en-
vironment is not managed to maintain an ecological unity with
the channel and the proposed legislation does not provide for a
program of shoreline management. The designated areas will be
managed either by the Secretary of Agriculture or the Interior as
they agree or in case of conflict, as directed by the President.
The use of the phrase "and related land area" to delineate wild
river areas raised fears that Senate Bill 1446 would result in wide-
scale federal curtailment of existing private diversions and land
uses within a sizable amount of territory adjacent to the river.192
In practice these fears will probably be unfounded. The con-
templated wild rivers system "will embrace rivers which largely
flow through public domain lands." Further, the Secretary of the
Interior's proposals for administering the system indicate that
land acquisition will be confined to small strips along the river and
that in many cases existing diversions will continue.193 The
Secretary indicated that "the bill contemplates that the authority
to acquire fee title will be utilized only in cases where the
acquisition of a scenic easement or other interests in land will not
be adequate."'9 4 These cases will probably be confined to in-
stances where public access to the stream must be provided. It is
necessary to give the Secretary a flexible standard to decide ques-
tions such as the width and type of interest to be acquired along
the banks and the uses to be allowed under the easement. The
term "related area" should provide a standard by which courts can
curtail excessive acquisitions should it become necessary to do
so. The fears of the private landowners can be lessened and a
more uniform policy of administration provided without sacri-
ficing the objectives of the program. This could be accomplished
191 See Meyers, supra note 174, at 72-73.
192 See, e.g., Hearings at 27 and 535. All proposed legislation requires that
area maps be placed on file with the appropriate offices of the Departments of
Interior or Agriculture. See S. 1446 § 3(a).
193The plans for administering the initial rivers designated in S. 1446 are
detailed in Hearings at 62-68 (statement of Secretary of the Interior Udall).194See Hearings at 7. Letter from Stewart H. Udall transmitting S. 1446 to
Hubert H. Humphrey in Hearings at 73. "We intend to make maximum use of
scenic easements.' (Statement of Hon. Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture).
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if the legislation specified the types of interests the Secretary is
empowered to acquire, e.g., access or scenic easements, 195 expresses
a preference for the type of interest to be acquired, and limits
fee simple acquisitions to providing public accesses and to elimi-
nating non-conforming uses.196 House Bill 14922 § 3 (h) attempted
to lessen fears of excessive condemnation by restricting fee simple
acquisitions to an area within one mile of either side of the stream
and condemnation of all other interests to within a two mile area.
Further guarantees that existing uses will not be seriously
threatened are found in sections 4 (d) and 5 (b) of Senate Bill
1446. Section 4 (d) provides that the Secretaries of the Interior and
the Agriculture can administer the areas pursuant to existing laws
and that they may grant grazing and timber cutting permits.
Section 5 (b) provides that the mineral leasing laws will continue to
be applicable subject to regulations designed to effectuate the
purposes of the program. These sections are open to criticism for
allowing the purposes of the Act to be subverted by giving the
Secretary discretion to allow considerable shoreline development.
Conflicts over the administration of the area may occur with the
Departments of the Interior and the Agriculture, since the depart-
ments charged with preservation are also charged with develop-
ment. For example, the Department of the Interior includes both
the National Park Service and the Bureau of Reclamation. These
conflicts are generally resolved internally, so that the Department
may present a unified front to Congress and the public.197 One
cause of interdepartmental conflict is the sweeping statutory
grants of authority given to the Secretary to administer our natural
resources. A decision for or against preservation can easily be
justified under the applicable legislative standard. Senate Bill
1446 deals with these conflicts by providing a more restrictive
standard for the administration of the system. "The wild river area
195 Wisconsin has held that condemnation of scenic easements is a taking of
property for a public purpose. Kramrowsld v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.V.2d
793 (1966). For a discussion of the legal problems of conservation easements, see
Scenic Areas: A Method, 40 IND. L.J. 402 (1964). See also, Twiss & Litton,
Resource Use in the Regional Landscape, 6 NAT. REs. J. 76 (1966).196 S. 1446 § 3(b) and H.R. 14922 § 3(h) require that recommendations for
additions to the system indicate the extent to which scenic easements are an
adequate substitute for fee simple interests.
197 For an account of the Secretary of Interior's efforts to maintain a uniform
Department policy during the conflict over the proposed construction of a dam in
Dinosaur National Monument, see Stratton and Sirotkin, The Echo Park Dam
Controversy and Upper River Development 74 (1955).
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shall be administered for the purposes of water conservation,
scenic, fish, wildlife, and outdoor recreation values contributing to
public enjoyment, but without limitation on other uses, including
timber harvesting and livestock grazing, that are harmonious with
these purposes."1 8 Conflicts will still occur but should be mini-
mized as Congress has indicated which values are primary and
which are secondary.
House Bill 14922 leaves much less discretion to the Secretary.
Timber harvesting and grazing are prohibited in Class I areas.
Timber harvesting is allowed within one-half mile of Class II and
III areas. No new roads are permitted within Class I, including
access roads areas, and not within 1,320 feet of Class II areas.
Landings and other related recreation structures are permitted
within Class II and III areas.
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to suggest that preserva-
tion of free-flowing water is a public value which should be
represented in water resources planning decisions and to suggest
methods of incorporating these values into the decision-making
process. At present, preservation is a value secondary to develop-
ment and will continue to remain so unless existing doctrines are
revised and new ones created. Existing laws governing water-
planning and allocation favor short term uses of water such as
power generation, flood control, and irrigation, over long term
uses. They make little provision for the possibility that future
generations may assign different priorities to the uses of water. It
is clear that the continued increase in the leisure time and
affluence of the majority of our citizens will demand that much
more water be used primarily for recreational uses. A balanced
recreation plan will accomodate all types of uses including those
which require a free-flowing stream. But, most important, these
198 Conservationists will probably object to the administration of the Act.
Almost complete discretion is vested in the Secretary of Agriculture to determine
land uses along the banks of rivers. Other areas are to be administered according
to the multiple use standard. A defect of this statutory scheme is that it leaves open
the possibility that the Secretary of Agriculure could subvert the policy of the
wild river system through an exercise of his broad discretion. Multiple Use Act
§ 1-2, 74 Stat. 215 (1960), 16 U.S.C. § 528-29 (1960). Although citizens may
object to his actions, the judiciary is reluctant to overturn the discretion of an
administration in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. See Reich, The Public
and the Natiores Forests, 50 CALm. L. tav. 381 (1962) .
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are decisions which future generations should be given the op-
portunity to make.
Water is a resource which must continually be developed, in
the foreseeable future, to support our technological society. But,
a different approach to water resources planning is needed-one
which stresses economic and non-economic values. Planners must
become more sensitive to alternative means of accomplishing the
goals -for which a dam should be built, e.g., greater consideration
of the prevention of floods by flood-plain zoning rather than
flood-control dams. Greater consideration should be given to
locating major impoundments downstream rather than upstream
since the stretches of river which merit preservation are generally
the upper reaches.199 The use of nuclear energy or fossil fuels as
a source of power should be encouraged.
The thesis of this article rubs against the grain of American
philosophy. Our value system is premised on the belief that there
must be continual change, for change is progress. However, a
glance at contemporary urban American seems to refute this as-
sumption. We seem to be creating a technology which will make
it possible for most of our citizens to spend at least one-half of
their waking hours in leisure activities, yet we are systematically
destroying the natural resources necessary to sustain a quality re-
creational experience. What sort of progress is it if the drive to
the water is an endless strip of neon shoeboxes and the time spent
on the water is as trying as negotiating the freeway at rush hour?
We need, in Stewart Udall's words, "a land conscience that will
inspire those daily acts of stewardship which will make America a
more pleasant and more productive land. '20 Preservation of some
of our remaining unharnessed stretches of river is a step in this
direction.
199 See Stone, High Dams and Upstream Storage, Second Annual Water Re-
sources Conference held at Univ. of Mont. in 1957.20 0 UDALL, THE Qu=r Crasis 202 (1963).
